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ABSTRACT
Information-Theoretically Secure Communication Under Channel Uncertainty.
(May 2012)
Hung Dinh Ly, B.S., Posts and Telecommunications Institute of Technology;
M.S., The University of Texas at Arlington
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Tie Liu
Secure communication under channel uncertainty is an important and challenging
problem in physical-layer security and cryptography. In this dissertation, we take a
fundamental information-theoretic view at three concrete settings and use them to
shed insight into efficient secure communication techniques for different scenarios
under channel uncertainty.
First, a multi-input multi-output (MIMO) Gaussian broadcast channel with two
receivers and two messages: a common message intended for both receivers (i.e., chan-
nel uncertainty for decoding the common message at the receivers) and a confidential
message intended for one of the receivers but needing to be kept asymptotically per-
fectly secret from the other is considered. A matrix characterization of the secrecy
capacity region is established via a channel-enhancement argument and an extremal
entropy inequality previously established for characterizing the capacity region of a
degraded compound MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel.
Second, a multilevel security wiretap channel where there is one possible real-
ization for the legitimate receiver channel but multiple possible realizations for the
eavesdropper channel (i.e., channel uncertainty at the eavesdropper) is considered. A
coding scheme is designed such that the number of secure bits delivered to the legit-
imate receiver depends on the actual realization of the eavesdropper channel. More
iv
specifically, when the eavesdropper channel realization is weak, all bits delivered to
the legitimate receiver need to be secure. In addition, when the eavesdropper channel
realization is strong, a prescribed part of the bits needs to remain secure. We call
such codes security embedding codes, referring to the fact that high-security bits are
now embedded into the low-security ones. We show that the key to achieving efficient
security embedding is to jointly encode the low-security and high-security bits. In
particular, the low-security bits can be used as (part of) the transmitter randomness
to protect the high-security ones.
Finally, motivated by the recent interest in building secure, robust and efficient
distributed information storage systems, the problem of secure symmetrical multilevel
diversity coding (S-SMDC) is considered. This is a setting where there are channel
uncertainties at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. The problem of
encoding individual sources is first studied. A precise characterization of the entire
admissible rate region is established via a connection to the problem of secure coding
over a three-layer wiretap network and utilizing some basic polyhedral structure of
the admissible rate region. Building on this result, it is then shown that the simple
coding strategy of separately encoding individual sources at the encoders can achieve
the minimum sum rate for the general S-SMDC problem.
vTo my family
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Broadcast is a fundamental nature of wireless communication: any receiver within
the transmission range can listen to the transmission and potentially decode some of
the messages. With appropriate coding architecture, the broadcast nature of wireless
communication can be used to the advantage of simultaneously transmitting to sev-
eral receivers at high rates. On the other hand, eavesdropping also becomes easier
due to the broadcast nature of wireless communication. The traditional approach to
protect against eavesdropping is cryptography. There are two different cryptographic
systems: secret-key cryptosystem and public-key cryptosystem [1]. Secret-key cryp-
tosystems require a secret key shared between the sender and the receiver. Compara-
tively, public-key cryptosystems do not require the pre-establishment of a secret key,
but are more susceptible to advanced attacks such as the man-in-the-middle attack.
Both cryptosystems are based on the assumption that the eavesdropper has limited
computation power and hence lack “absolute” security.
In 1949, Shannon introduced the notion of information-theoretic security. In his
seminal paper [2], Shannon defined a secrecy system to be perfectly secure if the ci-
pher text is statistically independent of the message. Note that this is the strongest
notion of security, as observing cipher text now does not entail any information re-
garding the message being sent. In his cipher system, Shannon assumed that 1)
The journal model is IEEE Transactions on Information Theory.
2Transmitter
Legitimate 
Receiver
Eavesdropper
M Mˆ
X
n
I(M ;Xn) = 0
Secret Key
Fig. 1. The Shannon cipher system.
the transmitter and the legitimate receiver share a secret key, which is unknown to
the eavesdropper; 2) transmission of the message is noiseless to both the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper. Under these assumptions, Shannon showed that to
have a perfect secrecy system, the length of the secret key should be at least as
long as the length of the message being sent [2]. See Fig. 1 for an illustration of
a Shannon cypher system. Shannon’s result on perfect secrecy systems is certainly
pessimistic. The reason for such pessimism was not clear until the work of Wyner
in the 1970’s. In his seminal paper [3], Wyner argued that the reason for Shan-
non’s pessimistic result is not because of the strong notion of information-theoretic
security, but actually due to the assumption that the transmission of the message is
over noiseless channels. By extending the Shannon cypher system to a noisy setting,
Wyner [3] considered the problem of communication over a broadcast channel with
two receivers, one interpreted as legitimate receiver and the other as eavesdropper.
3Transmitter
Legitimate
Receiver
Eavesdropper
M
X
n
Y n
Zn
p(y, z|x)
Mˆ
1
n
I(M ;Zn) → 0
Fig. 2. The wiretap channel.
Both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper channels are assumed to be known
at the transmitter. Furthermore, the eavesdropper channel is assumed to be noisier
than the legitimate receiver channel. By exploring the statistical advantage of the
legitimate receiver channel over the eavesdropper channel, one may design coding
schemes that can deliver a confidential message reliably to the legitimate receiver
while keeping it asymptotically perfectly secret from the eavesdropper. No secret key
is needed to achieve asymptotically perfectly secure communication. This result was
later extended to the general broadcast channel by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [4]. The line
of research was termed as the wiretap channel; see Fig. 2 for an illustration of the
basic model.
While assuming the transmitter’s knowledge of the legitimate receiver channel
might be reasonable (particularly when a feedback link is available), assuming that
the transmitter knows the eavesdropper channel is unrealistic in most scenarios. This
is mainly because the eavesdropper is an adversary, which usually has no incentive
to help the transmitter to acquire its channel state information. Hence, it is critical
4that physical layer security techniques are designed to withstand the uncertainty of
the eavesdropping channel only or of both the legitimate receiver channel and the
eavesdropper channel in general.
In this dissertation, we extend the basic channel model of Wyner [3] and Csisza´r-
Ko¨rner [4] to more complex and realistic secure communication scenarios under chan-
nel uncertainty. In particular, we take a fundamental information-theoretic view at
three concrete settings and use them to shed insight into efficient secure communica-
tion techniques for different scenarios under channel uncertainty.
1. Broadcast channels with common and confidential messages. Here,
in addition to the confidential message, there is also a common message intended
for both receivers (i.e., channel uncertainty for decoding the common message
at the receivers). This problem was first studied by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [4], who
derived a single-letter expression for the capacity region. In this dissertation,
our focus is on the specific MIMO communication scenario and to understand
the fundamental limitation of such MIMO secret communication.
2. Multilevel security wiretap channel. This problem is motivated by the
fact that assuming the transmitter’s knowledge of the eavesdropper channel is,
on most occasions, unrealistic. This is because the eavesdropper is an adver-
sary, which usually has no incentive to feedback its channel state information to
the transmitter. Hence, it is critical that communication schemes are designed
to withstand the uncertainty of the eavesdropper channel. In this setting, we
consider the communication scenario where there are multiple possible realiza-
tions for the eavesdropper channel. Which realization actually materializes is
unknown to the transmitter a priori (i.e., channel uncertainty at the eavesdrop-
per). Our goal is to design coding schemes such that the number of secure
5bits delivered to the legitimate receiver depends on the actual realization of the
eavesdropper channel. More specifically, when the eavesdropper channel real-
ization is strong, we require part of the bits delivered to the legitimate receiver
to be secure. On the other hand, when the eavesdropper channel realization is
weak, all bits delivered to the legitimate receiver need to be secure. We call
such codes security embedding codes, referring to the fact that high-security bits
are now embedded into low-security ones. Our main goal here is to understand
the fundamental limitations of the security embedding.
3. Secure symmetrical multilevel diversity coding. This source coding
problem is motivated by recent interest on building secure, robust and effi-
cient distributed information storage systems (e.g., storage cloud). Here, L−N
discrete memoryless information sources (S1, . . . , SL−N) of an decreasing impor-
tance order are encoded by L encoders. A legitimate receiver and an eavesdrop-
per have access to subsets U and A of the encoder outputs, respectively. Which
subsets U and A will materialize are unknown a priori at the encoders (i.e.,
channel uncertainties at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper).
However, no matter which subsets U and A actually occur, the k most impor-
tant sources (S1, . . . , Sk) need to be perfectly reconstructable at the legitimate
receiver whenever |U | = N + k, and all sources (S1, . . . , SL−N) need to be kept
perfectly secure from the eavesdropper as long as |A| ≤ N . Our ultimate goal
is to understand the fundamental limit of this secure communication scenario.
B. Prior Work
In this section, we briefly review some basic results on the secrecy capacity and
optimal encoding scheme for several classical wiretap channel settings. These re-
6sults provide performance and structural benchmarks for our study in the consequent
chapters. We first consider a discrete memoryless wiretap channel with transition
probability p(y, z|x), where X is the channel input, and Y and Z are the channel
outputs at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. This communi-
cation channel is illustrated in Fig. 2. The transmitter has a message M , uniformly
drawn from {1, . . . , 2nR} where n is the communication block length and R is the rate
of communication. The message M is intended for the legitimate receiver, but needs
to be kept asymptotically perfectly secret from the eavesdropper. Mathematically,
this secrecy constraint can be written as
1
n
I(M ;Zn)→ 0 (1.1)
in the limit as communication block length n → ∞, where Zn = (Z[1], . . . , Z[n]) is
the collection of the channel outputs at the eavesdropper during communication. A
communication rate R is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of codes of rate
R such that the message M can be reliably delivered to the legitimate receiver while
satisfying the asymptotic perfect secrecy constraint (1.1). The largest achievable rate
is termed as the secrecy capacity of the channel.
A discrete memoryless wiretap channel p(y, z|x) is said to be degraded if X →
Y → Z forms a Markov chain in that order. The secrecy capacity of a degraded
wiretap channel was characterized by Wyner [3] and can be written as
Cs(Py,z|x) = max
p(x)
[I(X ; Y )− I(X ;Z)] (1.2)
where the maximization is over all possible input distributions p(x). Later in [4],
it was shown that the degradation requirement can be replaced by a weaker “more
capable” condition. The scheme proposed in [3] to achieve the secrecy capacity (1.2)
is random binning, which can be described as follows.
7Consider a codebook of 2n(R+T ) codewords, each of length n. The codewords are
partitioned into 2nR bins, each containing 2nT codewords. Given a message m (which
is uniformly drawn from {1, . . . , 2nR}), the encoder randomly and uniformly chooses a
codeword xn in the mth bin and sends it through the channel. The legitimate receiver
needs to decode the entire codebook (and hence recover the transmitted message m),
so the overall rate R + T cannot be too high. On the other hand, the rate T of the
sub-codebooks in each bin represents the amount of external randomness injected
by the transmitter (transmitter randomness) into the channel and hence needs to
be sufficiently large to confuse the eavesdropper. With an appropriate choice of the
codebooks and the partitions of bins, it was shown in [3] that any communication rate
R less than the secrecy capacity (1.2) is achievable by the aforementioned random
binning scheme.
For a general discrete memoryless wiretap channel p(y, z|x) where the channel
outputs Y and Z are not necessarily ordered, the random binning scheme of [3] is not
necessarily optimal. In this case, the secrecy capacity of the channel was characterized
by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [4] and can be written as
Cs(Py,z|x) = max
p(v,x)
[I(V ; Y )− I(V ;Z)] (1.3)
where V is an auxiliary random variable satisfying the Markov chain V → X →
(Y, Z). The scheme proposed in [4] is to first prefix the channel input X by V and
view V as the input of the induced wiretap channel p(y, z|v) = ∑x p(y, z|x)p(x|v).
Applying the random binning scheme of [3] to the induced wiretap channel p(y, z|v)
proves the achievability of rate I(V ; Y )− I(V ;Z) for any given joint auxiliary-input
distribution p(v, x).
In communication engineering, communication channels are usually modeled as
discrete-time channels with real input and additive white Gaussian noise. Consider a
8(scalar) Gaussian wiretap channel where the channel outputs at the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper are given by
Y =
√
aX +N1
Z =
√
bX +N2.
(1.4)
Here, X is the channel input which is subject to the average power constraint
1
n
n∑
i=1
(X [i])2 ≤ P (1.5)
a and b are the channel gains for the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper channel
respectively, and N1 and N2 are additive white Gaussian noise with zero means and
unit variances. The secrecy capacity of the channel was characterized in [5] and can
be written as
Cs(P, a, b) =
[
1
2
log(1 + aP )− 1
2
log(1 + bP )
]+
(1.6)
where [x]+ := max(0, x). Note from (1.6) that Cs(P, a, b) > 0 if and only if a > b.
That is, for the Gaussian wiretap channel (1.4), asymptotic perfect secrecy commu-
nication is possible if and only if the legitimate receiver has a larger channel gain
than the eavesdropper. In this case, we can equivalently write the channel output Z
at the eavesdropper as a degraded version of the channel output Y at the legitimate
receiver, and the random binning scheme of [3] with Gaussian codebooks and full
transmit power achieves the secrecy capacity of the channel.
A closely related engineering scenario consists of a bank of L independent parallel
scalar Gaussian wiretap channels [6]. In this scenario, the channel outputs at the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are given by Y = (Y1, . . . , YL) and Z =
9(Z1, . . . , ZL) where
Yl =
√
alXl +N1,l
Zl =
√
blXl +N2,l
, l = 1, . . . , L. (1.7)
Here, Xl is the channel input for the lth subchannel, al and bl are the channel gains
for the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper channel respectively in the lth sub-
channel, and N1,l and N2,l are additive white Gaussian noise with zero means and
unit variances. Furthermore, (N1,l, N2,l) are independent for l = 1, . . . , L so all L
subchannels are independent of each other.
Two different types of power constraints have been considered: the average in-
dividual per-subchannel power constraint
1
n
n∑
i=1
(Xl[i])
2 ≤ Pl, l = 1, . . . , L (1.8)
and the average total power constraint
L∑
l=1
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
(Xl[i])
2
]
≤ P. (1.9)
Under the average individual per-subchannel power constraint (1.8), the secrecy ca-
pacity of the independent parallel Gaussian wiretap channel (1.7) is given by [6]
Cs({Pl, al, bl}Ll=1) =
L∑
l=1
Cs(Pl, al, bl) (1.10)
where Cs(P, a, b) is defined as in (1.6). Clearly, any communication rate less than the
secrecy capacity (1.10) can be achieved by using L separate scalar Gaussian wiretap
codes, each for one of the L subchannels. The secrecy capacity, Cs(P, {al, bl}Ll=1),
under the average total power constraint (1.9) is given by
Cs(P, {al, bl}Ll=1) = max
(P1,...,PL)
L∑
l=1
Cs(Pl, al, bl) (1.11)
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where the maximization is over all possible power allocations (P1, . . . , PL) such that∑L
l=1 Pl ≤ P . A waterfilling-like solution for the optimal power allocation was derived
in [6, Theorem 1], which provides an efficient way to numerically calculate the secrecy
capacity Cs(P, {al, bl}Ll=1). This line of wiretap channel (or physical-layer security)
research has been a very active area of research in information theory. One may refer
to [7] and [8] for overviews of recent progress in this field.
C. Dissertation Outline
Secure communication under channel uncertainty is an important and challenging
problem in physical-layer security and cryptography. In this dissertation, we take
a fundamental information-theoretic view at three concrete settings and use them
to shed insight into efficient secure communication techniques for different scenarios
under channel uncertainty.
First, a multi-input multi-output (MIMO) Gaussian broadcast channel with two
receivers and two messages: a common message intended for both receivers (i.e., chan-
nel uncertainty for decoding the common message at the receivers) and a confidential
message intended for one of the receivers but needing to be kept asymptotically per-
fectly secret from the other is considered. A matrix characterization of the secrecy
capacity region is established via a channel-enhancement argument and an extremal
entropy inequality previously established for characterizing the capacity region of a
degraded compound MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel.
Second, a multilevel security wiretap channel where there is one possible real-
ization for the legitimate receiver channel but multiple possible realizations for the
eavesdropper channel (i.e., channel uncertainty at the eavesdropper) is considered. A
coding scheme is designed such that the number of secure bits delivered to the legit-
11
imate receiver depends on the actual realization of the eavesdropper channel. More
specifically, when the eavesdropper channel realization is weak, all bits delivered to
the legitimate receiver need to be secure. In addition, when the eavesdropper channel
realization is strong, a prescribed part of the bits needs to remain secure. We call
such codes security embedding codes, referring to the fact that high-security bits are
now embedded into the low-security ones. We show that the key to achieving efficient
security embedding is to jointly encode the low-security and high-security bits. In
particular, the low-security bits can be used as (part of) the transmitter randomness
to protect the high-security ones.
Finally, motivated by the recent interest in building secure, robust and efficient
distributed information storage systems, the problem of secure symmetrical multilevel
diversity coding (S-SMDC) is considered. This is a setting where there are channel
uncertainties at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. The problem of
encoding individual sources is first studied. A precise characterization of the entire
admissible rate region is established via a connection to the problem of secure coding
over a three-layer wiretap network and utilizing some basic polyhedral structure of
the admissible rate region. Building on this result, it is then shown that the simple
coding strategy of separately encoding individual sources at the encoders can achieve
the minimum sum rate for the general S-SMDC problem.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II presents our
results on the multiple-input multiple-output Gaussian broadcast channel with com-
mon and confidential messages, which was reported in [9]. Chapter III presents our
results on the multilevel security wiretap channel. The results were also reported in
[10]. Chapter IV presents our results on the secure symmetrical multilevel diversity
coding, which were reported in [11]. Finally, in Chapter V, we summarize our main
contributions in this dissertation and point out some future research directions.
12
CHAPTER II
MULTIPLE-INPUT MULTIPLE-OUTPUT GAUSSIAN BROADCAST
CHANNELS WITH COMMON AND CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGES*
A. Introduction
Understanding the fundamental limits of multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) se-
crecy communication is an important research topic in wireless physical layer security.
A basic model of MIMO secrecy communication is a MIMO Gaussian broadcast chan-
nel with two receivers, for which the channel outputs at time index m are given by
Yk[m] = HkX[m] + Zk[m], k = 1, 2 (2.1)
where Hk is the (real) channel matrix of size rk × t for receiver k, and {Zk[m]}m
is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) additive vector Gaussian noise
process with zero mean and identity covariance matrix. The channel input {X[m]}m
is subject to an average total power constraint:
1
n
n∑
m=1
‖X[m]‖2 ≤ P. (2.2)
The transmitter has a set of two independent messages (W0,W1), where W0 is
a common message intended for both receivers 1 and 2, and W1 is a confidential
message intended for receiver 1 but needing to be kept secret from receiver 2. ∗The
∗Copyright 2011 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from H. D. Ly, T. Liu, and Y.
Liang, “Multiple-input multiple-output Gaussian broadcast channels with common
and confidential messages,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 56, no.
11, pp. 5477-5487, Nov. 2010. For more information, go to http://thesis.tamu.
edu/forms/IEEE\%20permission\%20note.pdf/view.
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Fig. 3. MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel with common and confidential messages.
confidentiality of messageW1 at receiver 2 is measured using the information-theoretic
criterion [3, 4]:
1
n
I(W1;Y
n
2 )→ 0 (2.3)
where Yn2 := (Y2[1], . . . ,Y2[n]), and the limit is taken as the block length n → ∞.
An illustration of this communication scenario is shown in Figure 3(a). The goal is to
characterize the entire rate region Cs(H1,H2, P ) that includes all rate pairs (R0, R1)
that can be achieved by any coding scheme. In this chapter, we term Cs(H1,H2, P )
as the secrecy capacity region despite the fact that W0 is not a confidential message.
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In their seminar work [4], Csisza´r and Ko¨rner considered the discrete memoryless
case of the problem. A single-letter expression of the secrecy capacity region was given
as the set of nonnegative rate pairs (R0, R1) satisfying
R0 ≤ min [I(U ; Y1), I(U ; Y2)]
R1 ≤ I(V ; Y1|U)− I(V ; Y2|U)
(2.4)
for some p(u, v, x, y1, y2) = p(u)p(v|u)p(x|v)p(y1, y2|x), where p(y1, y2|x) is the tran-
sition probability of the discrete memoryless broadcast channel. Thus, in principle,
the secrecy capacity region Cs(H1,H2, P ) can be computed by evaluating the Csisza´r-
Ko¨rner region (2.4) for the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (2.1).
However, directly evaluating (2.4) for the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel
(2.1) appears difficult due to the presence of the auxiliary variables U and V . Con-
sider, for example, the special case where the common message W0 is absent, i.e.,
R0 = 0. Let U be deterministic in (2.4). Then, the maximum of R1 can be deter-
mined by solving the optimization program
max
p(x,v)
[I(V ; Y1)− I(V ; Y2)] . (2.5)
In literature, the problem of communicating a confidential message over a MIMO
Gaussian broadcast channel is termed as the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel prob-
lem. Characterizing the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel
has been an active area of research in recent years. However, despite intensive effort
[12, 13, 14, 15, 16], determining the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap
channel via directly solving the optimization program (2.5) remains intractable.
Recently, Khisti and Wornell [14] and Oggier and Hassibi [15] studied the MIMO
Gaussian wiretap channel problem and proposed an indirect approach to solve the
optimization program (2.5). The main idea was to compute an upper bound on the
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secrecy capacity by considering a fictitious MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel in which
the legitimate receiver has access to both received signals {Y1[m]}m and {Y2[m]}m.
For any fixed correlation between the additive noise Z1[m] and Z2[m], Khisti and
Wornell [14] and Oggier and Hassibi [15] showed that Gaussian random binning
without prefix coding is optimal for the fictitious channel. Comparing the upper
bound (minimized over all possible correlations between Z1[m] and Z2[m]) with the
achievable secrecy rate by choosing a Gaussian V = X in the objective function of
(2.5) established an exact matrix characterization of the secrecy capacity. However,
matching the upper and lower bounds requires complicated matrix analysis, which
makes the approach difficult to extend to the more general scenario with both common
and confidential messages.
More recently, Liu and Shamai [16] presented an alternative, simpler character-
ization of the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel. Compared
with the work of [14] and [15], there are two key differences in the argument of [16]
1. Instead of the average total power constraint (2.2), [16] considered the more
general matrix power constraint:
1
n
n∑
m=1
(
X[m]XT[m]
)  S (2.6)
where S is a positive semidefinite matrix, and “” denotes “less than or equal
to” in the positive semidefinite ordering between real symmetric matrices.
2. Different from the Sato-like [17] argument of [14] and [15], the upper bound on
the secrecy capacity in [16] was obtained by considering an enhanced MIMO
Gaussian wiretap channel that has the same secrecy capacity as the original
wiretap channel. Channel-enhancement argument was first introduced by Wein-
garten et al. [18] to characterize the private message capacity region of the
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MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel; [16] was the first to apply this argument
to MIMO secrecy communication problems.
The main goal of this chapter is to adapt the channel-enhancement argument of
[16] to the more general problem of MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel with both
common and confidential messages. Our main result is that for the MIMO Gaussian
broadcast channel (2.1), a jointly Gaussian (U, V,X) with V = X is optimal for
the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner region (2.4). This establishes a matrix characterization of the
secrecy capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel under a matrix
power constraint.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section B, we summarize the
main results of the chapter. In Section C, we consider the special case of the MIMO
Gaussian broadcast channel (2.1) in which the channel matricesH1 andH2 are square
and invertible, and use a channel-enhancement argument to characterize the secrecy
capacity region. In Section D, we broaden the result of Section C, via a limiting
argument, to the general case, and characterize the secrecy capacity region of the
general MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel. We provide some numerical examples
to illustrate the main results of the chapter in Section E. Finally, in Section F, we
conclude the chapter with some remarks.
B. Main Results
The following theorem summarizes the secrecy capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian
broadcast channel with common and confidential messages under a matrix power
constraint.
Theorem 1. The secrecy capacity region Cs(H1,H2,S) of the MIMO Gaussian broad-
cast channel (2.1) with messages W0 (intended for both receivers 1 and 2) and W1
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(intended for receiver 1 but needing to be kept asymptotically perfectly secret from re-
ceiver 2) under the matrix power constraint (2.6) is given by the set of all nonnegative
rate pairs (R0, R1) satisfying
R0 ≤ min
(
1
2
log
∣∣∣H1SHT1 +Ir1
H1BH
T
1 +Ir1
∣∣∣ , 12 log ∣∣∣H2SHT2 +Ir2H2BHT2 +Ir2
∣∣∣)
R1 ≤ 12 log
∣∣H1BHT1 + Ir1∣∣− 12 log ∣∣H2BHT2 + Ir2∣∣
(2.7)
for some 0  B  S. Here, Irk denotes the identity matrix of size rk × rk.
As mentioned previously, the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel problem can be
considered as a special case here with the common rate R0 = 0. We have thus
recovered the main result of [16], restated below as a corollary.
Corollary 2 ([16]). The secrecy capacity Cs(H1,H2,S) of the MIMO Gaussian broad-
cast channel (2.1) with a confidential message messages W (intended for receiver 1
but needing to be kept asymptotically perfectly secret from receiver 2) under the matrix
power constraint (2.6) is given by
Cs(H1,H2,S) = max
0BS
(
1
2
log
∣∣H1BHT1 + Ir1∣∣− 12 log
∣∣H2BHT2 + Ir2∣∣
)
. (2.8)
In engineering practice, it is particularly relevant to consider the average total
power constraint. The following corollary summarizes the secrecy capacity region
of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel with common and confidential messages
under an average total power constraint. The result is a simple consequence of [18,
Lemma 1].
Corollary 3. The secrecy capacity region Cs(H1,H2, P ) of the MIMO Gaussian
broadcast channel (2.1) with messages W0 (intended for both receivers 1 and 2) and
W1 (intended for receiver 1 but needing to be kept asymptotically perfectly secret from
receiver 2) under the average total power constraint (2.2) is given by the set of all
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nonnegative rate pairs (R0, R1) satisfying
R0 ≤ min
[
1
2
log
∣∣∣H1(B1+B2)HT1 +Ir1
H1B1H
T
1 +Ir1
∣∣∣ , 12 log ∣∣∣H2(B1+B2)HT2 +Ir2H2B1HT2 +Ir2
∣∣∣]
R1 ≤ 12 log
∣∣H1B1HT1 + Ir1∣∣− 12 log ∣∣H2B1HT2 + Ir2∣∣
(2.9)
for some positive semidefinite matrices B1 and B2 with Tr(B1 +B2) ≤ P .
The achievability proof of Theorem 1 follows from the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner region
(2.4) by letting U be a t-dimensional Gaussian vector with zero mean and covariance
matrix S − B and V = X = U + G, where G is a t-dimensional Gaussian vector
with zero mean and covariance matrix B and is independent of U . Note that prefix
coding is not needed in communicating the confidential message W1 even though
the corresponding eavesdropper channel may not be degraded with respect to the
legitimate receiver channel.
The converse of Theorem 1 follows from an adaptation of the channel-enhancement
argument of [16] with the following two new ingredients:
1. To obtain an enhanced MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel that has the same
weighted secrecy sum-capacity as the original channel, we need to split receiver
1 into two virtual receivers: one as the legitimate receiver for the confidential
message W1, and the other as one of the intended receivers for the common
message W0. Only the legitimate receiver for the confidential message W1 is
enhanced in the proof.
2. With only a confidential message, in [16], the matrix characterization of the se-
crecy capacity of the enhanced channel was obtained via the worst noise result
of Diggavi and Cover [19]. With both common and confidential messages, char-
acterizing the secrecy capacity region of the enhanced channel becomes more
involved. In our proof, we resort to an extremal entropy inequality which was
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first proved by Weingarten et al. [20] for characterizing the capacity region of
a degraded compound MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel.
The details of the proof are provided in the next two sections.
C. Aligned MIMO Gaussian Broadcast Channel
In this section, we prove Theorem 1 for the special case where the channel matrices
H1 and H2 are square and invertible. In this case, multiplying both sides of (2.1) by
H−1k , the channel model can be equivalently written as
Yk[m] = X[m] + Zk[m], k = 1, 2 (2.10)
where {Zk[m]}m is an i.i.d. additive vector Gaussian noise process with zero mean
and covariance matrix
Nk = H
−1
k H
−T
k .
Following [18], we will term the channel model (2.10) as the aligned MIMO Gaus-
sian broadcast channel (see Figure 3(b)) and (2.1) as the general MIMO Gaussian
broadcast channel. The main result of this section is summarized in the following
theorem.
Theorem 4. The secrecy capacity region Cs(N1,N2,S) of the aligned MIMO Gaus-
sian broadcast channel (2.10) with messages W0 (intended for both receivers 1 and 2)
and W1 (intended for receiver 1 but needing to be kept asymptotically perfectly secret
from receiver 2) under the matrix power constraint (2.6) is given by the set of all
nonnegative rate pairs (R0, R1) satisfying
R0 ≤ min
(
1
2
log
∣∣∣ S+N1
B+N1
∣∣∣ , 12 log ∣∣∣ S+N2B+N2
∣∣∣)
R1 ≤ 12 log
∣∣∣B+N1
N1
∣∣∣− 12 log ∣∣∣B+N2N2
∣∣∣ (2.11)
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for some 0  B  S.
Proof. Let G be a t-dimensional Gaussian vector with zero mean and covariance
matrix B. Then, the achievability of (2.11) can be obtained from the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner
region (2.4) by letting U be a t-dimensional Gaussian vector with zero mean and
covariance matrix S − B and V = X = U + G, where U and G are assumed to be
independent. We therefore concentrate on proving the converse result.
To show that any achievable secrecy rate pair (R0, R1) for the aligned MIMO
Gaussian broadcast channel (2.10) must satisfy (2.11) for some 0  B  S, we may
assume, without loss of generality, that the matrix power constraint S ≻ 0. For the
case where S  0 but |S| = 0, let θ = Rank(S) < t. We can define an equivalent
aligned MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel with θ transmit and receive antennas and
a new covariance matrix power constraint that is strictly positive definite. Hence, we
can convert the case where S  0, |S| = 0 to the case where S ≻ 0 with the same
secrecy capacity region. See [18, Lemma 2] for a formal presentation of this argument.
For the case where S ≻ 0, we shall consider proof by contradiction as follows.
Assume that (Ro0, R
o
1) is an achievable secrecy rate pair for the aligned MIMO Gaus-
sian broadcast channel (2.10) that lies outside the rate region (2.11). Since (Ro0, R
o
1)
is achievable, Ro0 can be bounded from above as
Ro0 ≤ min
(
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣S+N1N1
∣∣∣∣ , 12 log
∣∣∣∣S+N2N2
∣∣∣∣
)
= Rmax0 . (2.12)
Moreover, if Ro1 = 0, then R
max
0 can be achieved by letting B = 0 in (2.11). Therefore,
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we can write Ro1 = R
∗
1 + δ for some δ > 0, where R
∗
1 is given by
maxB
1
2
log
∣∣∣B+N1
N1
∣∣∣− 12 log ∣∣∣B+N2N2
∣∣∣
subject to 1
2
log
∣∣∣ S+N1
B+N1
∣∣∣ ≥ Ro0
1
2
log
∣∣∣ S+N2
B+N2
∣∣∣ ≥ Ro0
0  B  S.
(2.13)
The above optimization program can be rewritten in the following standard form:
minB
1
2
log
∣∣∣B+N2
N2
∣∣∣− 12 log ∣∣∣B+N1N1
∣∣∣
subject to Ro0 − 12 log
∣∣∣ S+N1
B+N1
∣∣∣ ≤ 0
Ro0 − 12 log
∣∣∣ S+N2
B+N2
∣∣∣ ≤ 0
−B  0
B− S  0
(2.14)
which has one semidefinite variable, B, constrained by both scalar and semidefinite
inequalities. This is in fact an optimization problem with generalized constraints in
the form of semidefinite inequalities [21, p. 267]. Therefore, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) condition states that the derivative of the Lagrangian
L =
(
1
2
log
∣∣∣B+N2
N2
∣∣∣− 12 log ∣∣∣B+N1N1
∣∣∣)+∑2k=1 µk (Ro0 − 12 log ∣∣∣ S+NkB+Nk
∣∣∣)
+Tr ((−B)M1) + Tr ((B− S)M2)
(2.15)
must vanish at an optimal solution B∗.1 Here, Mk, k = 1, 2, are positive semidefinite
1As this optimization problem is not necessarily convex, a set of constraint quali-
fications (CQs) should be verified to make sure that the KKT conditions indeed hold.
The CQs stated in [18, Appendix D] hold in a trivial manner for this optimization
program.
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matrices such that
B∗M1 = 0 (2.16)
(S−B∗)M2 = 0 (2.17)
and µk ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, with equality if
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣ S+NkB∗ +Nk
∣∣∣∣ > Ro0.
We immediately have
µkR
o
0 =
µk
2
log
∣∣∣∣ S+NkB∗ +Nk
∣∣∣∣ , k = 1, 2. (2.18)
Taking derivative of the Lagrangian in (2.15) over B, the KKT condition can be
written as
∇B
(
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣B+N2N2
∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣B+N1N1
∣∣∣∣+
2∑
k=1
µk
(
Ro0 −
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣ S+NkB+Nk
∣∣∣∣
))
−M1 +M2 = 0
which gives
1
2
(B∗ +N1)
−1 +M1 =
µ1
2
(B∗ +N1)
−1 +
µ2 + 1
2
(B∗ +N2)
−1 +M2. (2.19)
By (2.13) and (2.18), we have
Ro1 + (µ1 + µ2)R
o
0 =
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣B∗ +N1N1
∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣B∗ +N2N2
∣∣∣∣
+
2∑
k=1
(
µk
2
log
∣∣∣∣ S+NkB∗ +Nk
∣∣∣∣
)
+ δ. (2.20)
Next, we shall find a contradiction to (2.20) by showing that for any achievable
23
Receiver 1b
Receiver 2
Receiver 1a
Transmitter
Wˆ0
1
n
I(W1;Y
n
2 )→ 0
Wˆ0
Zn2 i.i.d ∼ N (0,N2)
Wˆ1
Zn1b i.i.d ∼ N (0,N1)
Zn1a i.i.d ∼ N (0,N1)
Y
n
2
Y
n
1b
Y
n
1a
X
n(W0,W1)
(a) An equivalent view of the aligned MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel shown in Figure 3(b)
Receiver 1b
Receiver 2
Receiver 1a
Transmitter
Wˆ0
1
n
I(W1;Y
n
2 )→ 0
Wˆ0
Zn2 i.i.d ∼ N (0,N2)
Wˆ1
Zn1b i.i.d ∼ N (0,N1)
Y
n
2
Y
n
1b
Y
n
1a
X
n(W0,W1)
Zn1a i.i.d ∼ N (0, N˜1)
(b) The enhanced channel
Fig. 4. Enhanced MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel with common and confidential
messages.
secrecy rate pair (R0, R1),
R1 + (µ1 + µ2)R0 ≤ 1
2
log
∣∣∣∣B∗ +N1N1
∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣B∗ +N2N2
∣∣∣∣+
2∑
k=1
(
µk
2
log
∣∣∣∣ S+NkB∗ +Nk
∣∣∣∣
)
.
We divide our proof into three steps.
Step 1: Split receiver 1 into two virtual receivers.
Consider the following aligned MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel with three
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receivers:
Y1a[m] = X[m] + Z1a[m]
Y1b[m] = X[m] + Z1b[m]
Y2[m] = X[m] + Z2[m]
(2.21)
where {Z1a[m]}m, {Z1b[m]}m and {Z2[m]}m are i.i.d. additive vector Gaussian noise
processes with zero means and covariance matrices N1, N1 and N2, respectively.
Suppose that the transmitter has two independent messages W0 and W1, where W0
is intended for both receivers 1b and 2 and W1 is intended for receiver 1a but needs
to be kept secret from receiver 2. The confidentiality of message W1 at receiver 2
is measured using the information-theoretic criterion (2.3). See Figure 4(a) for an
illustration of this communication scenario.
Note that both receivers 1a and 1b in the aligned MIMO Gaussian broadcast
channel (2.21) have the same noise covariance matrices as receiver 1 in the aligned
MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (2.10), and receiver 2 in the aligned MIMO Gaus-
sian broadcast channel (2.21) has the same noise covariance matrix as receiver 2 in the
aligned MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (2.10). Therefore, any achievable secrecy
rate pair (R0, R1) for the aligned MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (2.21) can also
be achieved by the same coding scheme for the aligned MIMO Gaussian broadcast
channel (2.10), and vice versa. Thus, the aligned MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel
(2.21) has the same secrecy capacity region as the aligned MIMO Gaussian broadcast
channel in (2.10) under the same power constraints.
Step 2: Construct an enhanced channel.
Let N˜1 be a real symmetric matrix satisfying
1
2
(B∗ + N˜1)
−1 =
1
2
(B∗ +N1)
−1 +M1. (2.22)
25
Following [18, Lemma 11], we have
0 ≺ N˜1  N1 (2.23)
and ∣∣∣∣∣B
∗ + N˜1
N˜1
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣B∗ +N1N1
∣∣∣∣ . (2.24)
Moreover, substitute (2.22) into (2.19) and we have
1
2
(B∗ + N˜1)
−1 =
µ1
2
(B∗ +N1)
−1 +
µ2 + 1
2
(B∗ +N2)
−1 +M2. (2.25)
Note that (B∗+N1)
−1, (B∗+N2)
−1 and M2 are all positive semidefinite so we have
1
2
(B∗ + N˜1)
−1  1
2
(B∗ +N2)
−1
and hence
N˜1  N2. (2.26)
Now consider the following enhanced MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (see
Figure 4(b)):
Y˜1a[m] = X[m] + Z˜1a[m]
Y1b[m] = X[m] + Z1b[m]
Y2[m] = X[m] + Z2[m]
(2.27)
where {Z˜1a[m]}m, {Z1b[m]}m and {Z2[m]}m are i.i.d. additive vector Gaussian noise
processes with zero mean and covariance matrix N˜1, N1 and N2, respectively. Note
from (2.23) that N˜1  N1. We conclude that the secrecy capacity region of the
enhanced MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (2.27) is at least as large as the secrecy
capacity region of the aligned MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (2.21) under the
same power constraints.
Step 3: Bound from above the weighted secrecy sum-capacity of the
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enhanced channel.
Note from (2.23) and (2.26) that
0 ≺ N˜1  {N1,N2}. (2.28)
Thus, in the enhanced MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (2.27), the received signals
Y1b[m] and Y2[m] are (stochastically) degraded with respect to the received signal
Y1a[m]. In the following proposition, we shall consider the discrete memoryless case
of the enhanced channel (2.27) and provide a single-letter characterization of the
secrecy capacity region.
Proposition 1. Consider a discrete memoryless broadcast channel with transition
probability p(y˜1a, y1b, y2|x) and messages W0 (intended for both receivers 1b and 2)
and W1 (intended for receiver 1a but needs to be kept confidential from receiver 2). If
both
X → Y˜1a → Y1b and X → Y˜1a → Y2
form Markov chains in their respective order, then the secrecy capacity region of this
channel is given by the set of nonnegative rate pairs (R0, R1) satisfying
R0 ≤ min [I(U ; Y1b), I(U ; Y2)]
R1 ≤ I(X ; Y˜1a|U)− I(X ; Y2|U)
(2.29)
for some p(u, x, y˜1a, y1b, y2) = p(u)p(x|u)p(y˜1a, y1b, y2|x).
Proof. The achievability of (2.29) follows from a coding scheme that combines su-
perposition coding [22] and random binning [3]. The converse proof follows from the
steps similar to those in the converse proof in [4]. The details of the converse proof
are provided in Appendix A.
Remark 1. Prefix coding is no longer needed due to the preexisting Markov relation
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X → Y˜1a → Y2.
Next, to evaluate the single-letter expression (2.29) for the enhanced MIMO
Gaussian broadcast channel (2.27), we shall recall an extremal entropy inequality
which is a special case of [20, Corollary 4].
Proposition 2 ([20]). Let Z˜1a, Z1b and Z2 be t-dimensional Gaussian vectors with
zero means and covariance matrices N˜1, N1 and N2, respectively. Assume that N˜1,
N1 and N2 are ordered as in (2.28). Let S be a t× t positive definite matrix. If there
exists a t× t real symmetric matrix B∗ such that 0  B∗  S and satisfying
1
2
(B∗ + N˜1)
−1 = µλ
2
(B∗ +N1)
−1 + µ(1−λ)
2
(B∗ +N2)
−1 +M2
(S−B∗)M2 = 0
for some positive semidefinite matrix M2 and real scalars µ ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, then
h(X+Z˜1a|U)− µλh(X+ Z1b|U)− µ(1− λ)h(X+ Z2|U)
≤ 1
2
log |2πe(B∗ + N˜1)| − µλ
2
log |2πe(B∗ +N1)|
− µ(1− λ)
2
log |2πe(B∗ +N2)|
for any (X, U) independent of (Z˜1a,Z1b,Z2) such that E[XX
T]  S.
We are now ready to bound from above the weighted secrecy sum-capacity of
the enhanced channel (2.27). By Proposition 1, for any achievable secrecy rate pair
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(R0, R1) for the enhanced channel (2.27) we have
R1 + (µ1 + µ2)R0
≤ I(X; Y˜1a|U)− I(X;Y2|U) + (µ1 + µ2)min [I(U ;Y1b), I(U ;Y2)]
≤ I(X; Y˜1a|U)− I(X;Y2|U) + [µ1I(U ;Y1b) + µ2I(U ;Y2)]
= h(Z2)− h(Z˜1a) + µ1h(X+ Z1b) + µ2h(X+ Z2)
+
[
h(X+ Z˜1a|U)− µ1h(X+ Z1b|U)− (µ2 + 1)h(X+ Z2|U)
]
≤ 1
2
log |2πeN2| − 1
2
log
∣∣∣2πeN˜1∣∣∣+ 2∑
k=1
[µk
2
log |2πe(S+Nk)|
]
+
[
h(X+ Z˜1a|U)− µ1h(X+ Z1b|U)− (µ2 + 1)h(X+ Z2|U)
]
(2.30)
where the last inequality follows from the facts that
h(Z˜1a) =
1
2
log
∣∣∣2πeN˜1∣∣∣ ,
h(Z2) =
1
2
log |2πeN2| ,
h(X+ Z1b) ≤ 1
2
log |2πe(S+N1)| ,
and
h(X+ Z2) ≤ 1
2
log |2πe(S+N2)| .
Let µ = µ1 + µ2 + 1 and λ = µ1/(µ1 + µ2 + 1). We obtain from (2.25) (and
Proposition 2)
h(X+Z˜1a|U)− µ1h(X+ Z1b|U)− (µ2 + 1)h(X+ Z2|U)
≤ 1
2
log
∣∣∣2πe(B∗ + N˜1)∣∣∣− µ1
2
log |2πe(B∗ +N1)|
− µ2 + 1
2
log |2πe(B∗ +N2)| . (2.31)
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Substituting (2.31) into (2.30), we have
R1 + (µ1 + µ2)R0
≤ 1
2
log |2πeN2| − 1
2
log
∣∣∣2πeN˜1∣∣∣+ 2∑
k=1
[µk
2
log |2πe(S+Nk)|
]
+
[
1
2
log
∣∣∣2πe(B∗ + N˜1)∣∣∣− µ1
2
log |2πe(B∗ +N1)|
−µ2 + 1
2
log |2πe(B∗ +N2)|
]
=
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣∣B
∗ + N˜1
N˜1
∣∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣B∗ +N2N2
∣∣∣∣+
2∑
k=1
[
µk
2
log
∣∣∣∣ S+NkB∗ +Nk
∣∣∣∣
]
=
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣B∗ +N1N1
∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣B∗ +N2N2
∣∣∣∣+
2∑
k=1
[
µk
2
log
∣∣∣∣ S+NkB∗ +Nk
∣∣∣∣
]
(2.32)
for any achievable secrecy rate pair (R0, R1) for the enhanced MIMO Gaussian broad-
cast channel (2.27). Here, the last equality follows from (2.24).
Finally, combining Steps 1 and 2, we conclude that any achievable secrecy rate
pair for the original aligned MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (2.10) is also achiev-
able for the enhanced MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (2.27). Thus, (2.32) holds
for any achievable secrecy rate pair (R0, R1) for the original aligned MIMO Gaussian
broadcast channel (2.10). Since δ > 0, this contradicts (2.20). Therefore, any achiev-
able secrecy rate pair (R0, R1) for the aligned MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel
(2.10) must satisfy (2.11) for some 0  B  S. This is the desired converse result,
which completes the proof of the theorem.
D. General MIMO Gaussian Broadcast Channel
In this section, we Theorem 1 by extending the secrecy capacity result of Theorem 4
on the aligned MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel to the general MIMO broadcast
channel. As mentioned in Section A, the achievability of the rate region (2.7) can
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be obtained from the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner region (2.4) with proper choice of input and
auxiliary variables (U, V,X). We therefore concentrate on proving the converse part
of the theorem. Also as mentioned previously, the case when both channel matrices
H1 andH2 are square and invertible can be easily transformed into an aligned MIMO
Gaussian broadcast channel and thus has been proved by Theorem 4. Our goal next is
to approximate a general MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel with an aligned MIMO
Gaussian broadcast channel.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the channel matrices H1 and H2 are
square (but not necessarily invertible). If that is not the case, we can apply singular
value decomposition (SVD) to show that there exists an equivalent channel that has
t × t square channel matrices and the same secrecy capacity region as the original
channel [18, Section V-B].
Using SVD, we can write the channel matrices as
Hk = UkΛkV
T
k , k = 1, 2
where Uk and Vk are t × t unitary matrices, and Λk is diagonal. We now define a
new MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel:
Yk[m] = HkX[m] + Zk[m] k = 1, 2 (2.33)
where
Hk = Uk(Λk + αIt)V
T
k
for some α > 0. Note that the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (2.33) does have
invertible channel matrices. By Theorem 4, the secrecy capacity, Cs(H1,H2,S), under
the matrix power constraint (2.6) is given by the set of all nonnegative rate pairs
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(R0, R1) satisfying
R0 ≤ min
(
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣H1SHT1 +Ir1H1BHT1 +Ir1
∣∣∣∣ , 12 log
∣∣∣∣H2SHT2 +Ir2H2BHT2 +Ir2
∣∣∣∣
)
R1 ≤ 12 log
∣∣∣H1BHT1 + Ir1∣∣∣− 12 log ∣∣∣H2BHT2 + Ir2∣∣∣
for some 0  B  S.
Further note that we can write Hk = DkHk where
Dk = UkΛk(Λk + αIt)
−1UTk .
Since D2k ≺ It, we have [20, Definition 1]
X→ Yk → Yk (2.34)
forms a Markov chain for k = 1, 2. Therefore, both receivers 1 and 2 receive a better
signal in the new channel (2.33) than in the original channel (2.1). Note that receiver
2 also plays the role of an eavesdropper for the confidential message W1. Therefore,
unlike the private message problem considered in [18], enhancing both receivers in
the channel does not necessarily lead to an increase in the secrecy capacity region.
In the following, however, we show that
Cs(H1,H2,S) ⊆ Cs(H1,H2,S) +O(H2,H2,S) (2.35)
where
O(H2,H2,S) :=
{
(0, R1) : 0 ≤ R1 ≤ 1
2
log
∣∣∣H2SHT2 + It∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣H2SHT2 + It∣∣
}
Let (R0, R1) be an achievable secrecy rate pair for the MIMO Gaussian broadcast
channel (2.1). By the result of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [4], there exists a collection of input
and auxiliary variables (U, V,X) satisfying the Markov relation U → V → X such
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that
R0 ≤ min [I(U ;Y1), I(U ;Y2)]
R1 ≤ I(V ;Y1|U)− I(V ;Y2|U).
Also by the result of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [4], the secrecy rate pair (R0, R1) given by
R0 = min
[
I(U ;Y1), I(U ;Y2)
]
R1 = I(V ;Y1|U)− I(V ;Y2|U)
is achievable for the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (2.33). By the Markov rela-
tion (2.34), we have
I(U ;Yk) ≤ I(U ;Yk),
I(V ;Yk|U) ≤ I(V ;Yk|U),
and
I(X;Yk|U, V ) ≤ I(X;Yk|U, V )
for k = 1, 2. Hence, we have
R0 − R0 ≤ min [I(U ;Y1), I(U ;Y2)]−min
[
I(U ;Y1), I(U ;Y2)
] ≤ 0 (2.36)
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and
R1 −R1 ≤ I(V ;Y1|U)− I(V ;Y2|U)−
[
I(V ;Y1|U)− I(V ;Y2|U)
]
= I(V ;Y2|U)− I(V ;Y2|U)−
[
I(V ;Y1|U)− I(V ;Y1|U)
]
≤ I(V ;Y2|U)− I(V ;Y2|U)
= I(U, V ;Y2)− I(U, V ;Y2)−
[
I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Y2)
]
≤ I(U, V ;Y2)− I(U, V ;Y2)
= I(X;Y2)− I(X;Y2)−
[
I(X;Y2|U, V )− I(X;Y2|U, V )
]
≤ I(X;Y2)− I(X;Y2)
= I(X;Y2|Y2) (2.37)
≤ max
0BS
(
1
2
log
∣∣∣H2BHT2 + It∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣H2BHT2 + It∣∣
)
(2.38)
=
1
2
log
∣∣∣H2SHT2 + It∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣H2SHT2 + It∣∣ (2.39)
where (2.37) follows from the Markov relation (2.34), (2.38) follows from a well-
known inequality due to Thomas [23, Lemma 1], and (2.39) follows from the fact that
HT2H2 ≺ HT2H2. Combining (2.36) and (2.39) established the set relationship (2.35).
Finally, let α ↓ 0 on both sides of (2.35). Note that Hk → Hk for k = 1, 2, so
Cs(H1,H2,S) converges to the rate region (2.7) and O(H2,H2,S) → {(0, 0)}. We
thus have proved the desired converse result and completed the proof of the theorem.
E. Numerical Examples
In this section, we illustrate the results of Theorem 1 and Corollary 3 by numerical ex-
amples. Note that finding the boundaries of the secrecy capacity regions Cs(H1,H2,S)
and Cs(H1,H2, P ) as expressed in (2.7) and (2.9) involves solving nonconvex optimiza-
tion programs and hence is nontrivial. Following the work in [25], we can rewrite the
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expressions (2.7) and (2.9) such that the optimization program for finding the bound-
aries of Cs(H1,H2,S) and Cs(H1,H2, P ) become tractable for the case where each of
the receivers is equipped with only one receive antenna, i.e., rk = 1 for k = 1, 2. As
we limit the discussion in this section to the single receive antenna case, the channel
matrices Hk become the 1× t channel vectors hk, k = 1, 2.
To compute the secrecy capacity region Cs(h1,h2,S), consider re-parameterizing
(R0, R1) using (α, γ0) as
R0 =
1
2
log(1 + αγ0)
R1 =
1
2
log(1 + α(1− γ0)).
(2.40)
Thus, to see whether a particular secrecy rate pair (R0, R1) is inside Cs(h1,h2,S) as
expressed in (2.7), one may check, instead, whether there exists a positive semidefinite
matrix B which satisfies the set of constraints:
h1(S−B)hT1 ≥ αγ0(h1BhT1 + 1)
h2(S−B)hT2 ≥ αγ0(h2BhT2 + 1)
h1Bh
T
1 − h2BhT2 ≥ α(1− γ0)(h2BhT2 + 1)
B  S.
(2.41)
Note that all the constraints in (2.41) are linear in B. Hence, whether there exists
a feasible solution can be examined using standard semidefinite programming tech-
niques (i.e., CVX, a package for specifying and solving convex programs [24]). Note
from (2.40) that both R0 and R1 increase as α increases. Therefore, for a fixed γ0,
a boundary point of Cs(h1,h2,S) can be found by searching over the maximum α
such that the set of constraints in (2.41) admits a feasible solution. Sweeping over
γ0 ∈ [0, 1] gives all the boundary points of Cs(h1,h2,S).
Similarly, to compute the secrecy capacity region Cs(h1,h2, P ), we consider the
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Fig. 5. An illustration of the secrecy capacity regions of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast
channel with common and confidential messages.
set of constraints for a pair of positive semidefinite matrices (B1,B2):
h1B2h
T
1 ≥ αγ0(h1B1hT1 + 1)
h2B2h
T
2 ≥ αγ0(h2B1hT2 + 1)
h1B1h
T
1 − h2B1hT2 ≥ α(1− γ0)(h2B1hT2 + 1)
Tr(B1 +B2) ≤ P.
(2.42)
Again, all the constraints in (2.42) are linear in (B1,B2) so whether there exists a fea-
sible solution can be examined using standard semidefinite programming techniques
[24]. Therefore, for a fixed γ0, a boundary point of Cs(h1,h2, P ) can be found by
searching over the maximum α such that the set of constraints in (2.42) admits a fea-
sible solution. Sweeping over γ0 ∈ [0, 1] gives all the boundary points of Cs(h1,h2, P ).
Figure 5 plots the secrecy capacity regions Cs(h1,h2,S) and Cs(h1,h2, P ) for the
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channel vectors h1 = [2 0.4] and h2 = [0.4 1] and power constraints
S =

 3.3333 1.2346
1.2346 1.6667


and P = Tr(S) = 5. For comparison, in Figure 5, we have also plotted the capacity
regions of the same MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel with a common message
W0 intended for both receiver 1 and 2 and a private message W1 intended only for
receiver 1 (but without any secrecy constraints). This problem is known as the MIMO
Gaussian broadcast channel with degraded message sets [25, 26]. As shown in [25],
the capacity region, C(h1,h2,S), under the matrix power constraint (2.6) is given by2
C(h1,h2,S) = R1(h1,S) ∩ R2(h1,h2,S)
where R1(h1,S) is given by the nonnegative rate pairs (R0, R1) satisfying
R0 +R1 ≤ 1
2
log(h1Sh
T
1 + 1),
and R2(h1,h2,S) is given by the nonnegative rate pairs (R0, R1) satisfying
R0 ≤ 12 log
(
h2Sh
T
2 +1
h2Bh
T
2 +1
)
R1 ≤ 12 log(h1BhT1 + 1)
for some 0  B  S. Similarly, the capacity region, C(h1,h2, P ), under the average
total power constraint (2.2) is given by
C(h1,h2, P ) = R1(h1, P ) ∩ R2(h1,h2, P )
2As shown in [25], this result holds for the general MIMO Gaussian broadcast
channel, not just for the single receive antenna case.
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where R1(h1, P ) is given by the nonnegative rate pairs (R0, R1) satisfying
R0 +R1 ≤ 1
2
log(P‖h1‖2 + 1),
and R2(h1,h2, P ) is given by the nonnegative rate pairs (R0, R1) satisfying
R0 ≤ 12 log
(
h2(B1+B2)hT2 +1
h2B1h
T
2 +1
)
R1 ≤ 12 log(h1B1hT1 + 1)
for some B1  0, B2  0 and Tr(B1 +B2) ≤ P . The boundaries of the rate regions
R2(h1,h2,S) and R2(h1,h2, P ) can be computed similarly to those of Cs(h1,h2,S)
and Cs(h1,h2, P ), respectively. As expected, for any given common rate R0, the
maximum secrecy rate is less than (or equal to) the maximum private rate due to the
additional secrecy constraint at receiver 2.
F. Concluding Remarks
This chapter considered the problem of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel with
two receivers and two messages: a common message intended for both receivers, and a
confidential message intended for one of the receivers but needing to be kept asymp-
totically perfectly secure from the other. A matrix characterization of the secrecy
capacity region is established via a channel enhancement argument. The enhanced
channel is constructed by first splitting the receiver that decodes both messages into
two virtual receivers and then enhancing only the virtual receiver that decodes the
confidential message. The secrecy capacity region of the enhanced channel is charac-
terized using an extremal entropy inequality previously established for characterizing
the capacity region of a degraded compound MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel.
After the initial submission of our paper [9], [27] and [28] considered the problem
of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel with two receivers and three messages:
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a common message intended for both receivers, and two confidential messages each
intended for one of the receivers but needing to be kept asymptotically perfectly
secure from the other. A matrix characterization of the secrecy capacity region was
established, which generalized the main results of our paper. It is worth mentioning
that the set of techniques developed/applied in our paper, more specifically receiver
splitting and the extremal entropy inequality in Proposition 2, was also used in [27]
and [28] in proving their converse results.
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CHAPTER III
SECURITY EMBEDDING CODES*
A. Introduction
A basic model of physical layer security, as discussed in Chapter I, is a broadcast
channel [3, 4] with two receivers, a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper. Both the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper channels are assumed to be known at the
transmitter. By exploring the statistical difference between the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper channel, one may design coding schemes that can deliver a
message reliably to the legitimate receiver while keeping it asymptotically perfectly
secret from the eavesdropper.
While assuming the transmitter’s knowledge of the legitimate receiver channel
might be reasonable (particularly when a feedback link is available), assuming that
the transmitter knows the eavesdropper channel is unrealistic in most scenarios. This
is mainly because the eavesdropper is an adversary, which usually has no incentive
to help the transmitter to acquire its channel state information. Hence, it is critical
that physical layer security techniques are designed to withstand the uncertainty of
the eavesdropper channel.
In this chapter, we consider a communication scenario where there are multiple
possible realizations for the eavesdropper channel. Which realization will actually
occur is unknown to the transmitter. ∗Our goal is to design coding schemes such that
∗Copyright 2012 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from H. D. Ly, T. Liu, and
Y. Blankenship, “Security embedding codes,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 148-159, Feb. 2012. For more information,
go to http://thesis.tamu.edu/forms/IEEE\%20permission\%20note.pdf/view.
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the number of secure bits delivered to the legitimate receiver depends on the actual
realization of the eavesdropper channel. More specifically, when the eavesdropper
channel realization is weak, all bits delivered to the legitimate receiver need to be
secure. In addition, when the eavesdropper channel realization is strong, a prescribed
part of the bits needs to remain secure. We call such codes security embedding codes,
referring to the fact that high-security bits are now embedded into the low-security
ones. We envision that such codes are naturally useful for the secrecy communica-
tion scenarios where information bits are not created equal: some of them have more
security priorities than the others and hence require stronger security protection dur-
ing communication. For example, in real wireless communication systems, control
plane signals have higher secrecy requirements than data plane transmissions, and
signals that carry users’ identities and cryptographic keys require stronger security
protections than the other signals.
A key question that we consider is at what expense one may allow part of the
bits to enjoy additional security protections. Note that a “naive” security embedding
scheme is to design two separate secrecy codes to provide two different levels of
security protections, and apply them to two separate parts of the information bits
via time sharing. In this scheme, the high-security bits are protected using a stronger
secrecy code and hence are communicated at a lower rate. The overall communication
rate is a convex combination of the low-security bit rate and the high-security bit
rate and hence is lower than the low-security bit rate. Another simple scheme for
security embedding is power sharing [29], where the transmitted signal is given by
the superposition of two secrecy codes separately designed to protect the low-security
and high-security bits. Though generally better than the time-sharing scheme, the
overall rate of communication for the power-sharing scheme is still lower than that
when all bits delivered are lower-security ones.
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The main result of this chapter is to show that it is possible to have a significant
portion of the information bits enjoying additional security protections without sac-
rificing the overall rate of communication. This further justifies the name “security
embedding,” as now having part of the information bits enjoying additional security
protections is only an added bonus. More specifically, in this chapter, we call a secrecy
communication scenario embeddable if a nonzero fraction of the information bits can
enjoy additional security protections without sacrificing the overall communication
rate, and we call it perfectly embeddable if the high-security bits can be communi-
cated at full rate (as if the low-security bits do not exist) without sacrificing the
overall communication rate. The key to achieving efficient security embedding is to
jointly encode the low-security and high-security bits (as opposed to separate encod-
ing as in the time- and power-sharing schemes). In particular, the low-security bits
can be used as (part of) the transmitter randomness to protect the high-security bits
(when the eavesdropper channel realization is strong); this is the key feature of our
proposed security embedding codes.
Our definition of security embedding and proposed coding schemes are mainly
motivated by the special case where there are no secrecy constraints on the “low-
security” bits. In this case, the problem of security embedding reduces to the problem
of simultaneously communicating a private message and a confidential message, for
which the secrecy capacity region was established in [30, p. 411] and [31]. Our main
technical contribution in this chapter is to extend the setting of [30, p. 411] and
[31] to the general case where both low-security and high-security bits are subject to
(different) asymptotic perfect secrecy constraints.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section B, an information-
theoretic formulation of the security embedding problem is presented, which we term
as the two-level security wiretap channel. A coding scheme that combines rate split-
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ting, superposition coding, nested binning, and channel prefixing is proposed and is
shown to achieve the secrecy capacity region of the channel in several scenarios. Based
on the results of Section B, in Section C we study the engineering communication
models with real channel input and additive white Gaussian noise, and show that
both scalar and independent parallel Gaussian (under an individual per-subchannel
average power constraint) two-level security wiretap channels are perfectly embed-
dable. In Section D, we extend the results of Section B to the wiretap channel II
setting of Ozarow and Wyner [32], and show that two-level security wiretap channels
II are also perfectly embeddable. Finally, in Section E, we conclude the chapter with
some remarks.
B. Two-Level Security Wiretap Channel
1. Channel Model
Consider a discrete memoryless broadcast channel with three receivers and transition
probability p(y, z1, z2|x). The receiver that receives the channel output Y is a legit-
imate receiver. The receivers that receive the channel outputs Z1 and Z2 represent
two possible realizations of an eavesdropper. Assume that the channel output Z2 is
degraded with respect to the channel output Z1, i.e., X → Z1 → Z2 forms a Markov
chain in that order, so Z1 represents a stronger realization of the eavesdropper than
Z2.
The transmitter has two independent messages: a high-security message M1
uniformly drawn from {1, . . . , 2nR1} and a low-security message M2 uniformly drawn
from {1, . . . , 2nR2} where n is the block length, and R1 and R2 are the corresponding
rates of communication. Both messages M1 and M2 are intended for the legitimate
receiver, and need to be kept asymptotically perfectly secure when the eavesdropper
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Fig. 6. Two-level security wiretap channel.
realization is weak, i.e.,
1
n
I(M1,M2;Z
n
2 )→ 0 (3.1)
in the limit as n→∞. In addition, when the eavesdropper realization is strong, the
high-security message M1 needs to remain asymptotically perfectly secure, i.e.,
1
n
I(M1;Z
n
1 )→ 0 (3.2)
in the limit as n → ∞. A rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable if there is a
sequence of codes of rate pair (R1, R2) such that both messages M1 and M2 can be
reliably delivered to the legitimate receiver while satisfying the asymptotic perfect
secrecy constraints (3.1) and (3.2). The collection of all possible achievable rate
pairs is termed as the secrecy capacity region of the channel. Fig. 6 illustrates this
communication scenario, which we term as two-level security wiretap channel.
The above setting of two-level security wiretap channel is closely related to the
traditional wiretap channel setting of [3, 4]. More specifically, without the additional
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secrecy constraint (3.2) on the high-security message M1, we can simply view the
messages M1 and M2 as a single (low-security) message M with rate R1 + R2. In
this case, the problem reduces to communicating the message M over the traditional
wiretap channel with transition probability p(y, z2|x) =
∑
z1
p(y, z1, z2|x), and the
maximum achievable R1 + R2 is given by Cs(Py,z2|x). Similarly, without needing to
communicate the low-security message M2 (i.e., R2 = 0), the basic secrecy constraint
(3.1) reduces to (1/n)I(M1;Z
n
2 ) → 0, which is implied by the additional secrecy
constraint (3.2) due to the assumption that Z2 is degraded with respect to Z1. In this
case, the problem reduces to communicating the high-security message M1 over the
traditional wiretap channel with transition probability p(y, z1|x) =
∑
z2
p(y, z1, z2|x),
and the maximum achievable R1 is given by Cs(Py,z1|x). We thus have the following
simple observation.
Fact 1. A two-level security wiretap channel p(y, z1, z2|x) where Z2 is degraded with
respect to Z1 is embeddable if there exists a sequence of codes with rate pair (R1, R2)
such that R1 + R2 = Cs(Py,z2|x) and R1 > 0, and it is perfectly embeddable if there
exists a sequence of codes with rate pair (R1, R2) such that R1+R2 = Cs(Py,z2|x) and
R1 = Cs(Py,z1|x).
An important special case of the two-level security wiretap channel problem
considered here is when the channel output Z2 is a constant signal. In this case, the
secrecy constraint (3.1) becomes obsolete, and the low-security message M2 becomes
a private message without being subject to any secrecy constraints. The problem of
simultaneously communicating a private message and a confidential message over a
discrete memoryless wiretap channel was considered in [30, p. 411] and [31], where
a single-letter characterization of the secrecy capacity region was established. For
the general two-level security wiretap channel problem that we consider here, both
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high-security message M1 and the low-security message M2 are subject to asymptotic
perfect secrecy constraints, which makes the problem much more involved.
2. Main Results
The following theorem provides a sufficient condition for establishing the achievability
of a rate pair for the discrete memoryless two-level security wiretap channel.
Theorem 5. Consider a discrete memoryless two-level security wiretap channel with
transition probability p(y, z1, z2|x) where Z2 is degraded with respect to Z1. A nonneg-
ative pair (R1, R2) is an achievable rate pair of the channel if it satisfies
R1 ≤ I(V ; Y |U)− I(V ;Z1|U)
and R1 +R2 ≤ I(V ; Y |S)− I(V ;Z2|S)
(3.3)
for some joint distribution p(s, u, v, x), where S, U and V are auxiliary random vari-
ables satisfying the Markov chain S → U → V → X → (Y, Z1, Z2).
A proof of the theorem is provided in Section 3. Note that to show that every
rate pair that satisfies (3.3) is achievable, we only need to consider the case where
I(U ; Y |S) ≥ I(U ;Z2|S). This can be seen as follows. Assuming that I(U ; Y |S) ≤
I(U ;Z2|S), we have
I(V ; Y |S)− I(V ;Z2|S)
= I(V ; Y |U)− I(V ;Z2|U) + [I(U ; Y |S)− I(U ;Z2|S)] (3.4)
≤ I(V ; Y |U)− I(V ;Z2|U). (3.5)
It follows that every rate pair that satisfies (3.3) must satisfy
R1 ≤ I(V ; Y |U)− I(V ;Z1|U)
and R1 +R2 ≤ I(V ; Y |U)− I(V ;Z2|U)
(3.6)
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which is a special case of (3.3) by setting S = U so that I(U ; Y |S) = I(U ;Z2|S) = 0.
To show that every rate pair that satisfies (3.3) for which I(U ; Y |S) ≥ I(U ;Z2|S)
is achievable, we shall consider a coding scheme that combines rate splitting, super-
position coding, nested binning, and channel prefixing. In particular, (part of) the
low-security message M2 will be used as (part of) the transmitter randomness to
protect the high-security message M1 (when the eavesdropper channel realization is
strong). See Section 3 for the details of the proof.
Combining Theorem 5 with Fact 1, we have the following sufficient conditions for
establishing that a two-level security wiretap channel is (perfectly) embeddable. The
conditions are stated in terms of the existence of a joint auxiliary-input distribution.
Corollary 6. A two-level security wiretap channel p(y, z1, z2|x) where Z2 is degraded
with respect to Z1 is embeddable if there exists a joint distribution p(s, u, v, x) satis-
fying the Markov chain S → U → V → X → (Y, Z1, Z2) and such that
I(V ; Y |S)− I(V ;Z2|S) = Cs(Py,z2|x)
and I(V ; Y |U)− I(V ;Z1|U) > 0
(3.7)
and it is perfectly embeddable if there exists a joint distribution p(s, u, v, x) satisfying
the Markov chain S → U → V → X → (Y, Z1, Z2) and such that
I(V ; Y |S)− I(V ;Z2|S) = Cs(Py,z2|x)
and I(V ; Y |U)− I(V ;Z1|U) = Cs(Py,z1|x).
(3.8)
Assume that Y is less noisy than Z2, i.e., I(U ; Y ) ≥ I(U ;Z2) for any random
variable U satisfying the Markov chain U → X → (Y, Z2). In this case, we have a
precise characterization of the secrecy capacity region as summarized in the following
theorem.
Theorem 7. Consider a discrete memoryless two-level security wiretap channel with
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transition probability p(y, z1, z2|x) where Z2 is degraded with respect to Z1 and Y is
less noisy than Z2. The secrecy capacity region of the channel is given by the set of
all nonnegative pairs (R1, R2) that satisfy
R1 ≤ I(V ; Y |U)− I(V ;Z1|U)
and R1 +R2 ≤ I(V ; Y )− I(V ;Z2)
(3.9)
for some joint distribution p(u, v, x), where U and V are auxiliary random variables
satisfying the Markov chain U → V → X → (Y, Z1, Z2).
The forward part of the theorem follows directly from Theorem 5 by setting S
to be constant. The converse part of the theorem is proved in Appendix B, which
mainly involves identifying a choice for the auxiliary random variables U and V . Note
that when the channel output Z2 is constant, the conditions that Z2 is degraded with
respect to Z1 and Y is less noisy than Z2 are trivially met by any channel outputs
(Y, Z1). In this case, Theorem 7 recovers the results of [30, p. 411] and [31] on
simultaneously communicating a private message and a confidential message over a
discrete memoryless wiretap channel.
Assume, instead, that Y is less noisy than Z1. Given that Z2 is degraded with
respect to Z1, this implies that Y is also less noisy than Z2. In this case, we have
I(V ; Y |U)− I(V ;Z1|U)
= I(V ; Y )− I(V ;Z1)− [I(U ; Y )− I(U ;Z1)] (3.10)
≤ I(V ; Y )− I(V ;Z1) (3.11)
= I(X ; Y )− I(X ;Z1)− [I(X ; Y |V )− I(X ;Z1|V )] (3.12)
≤ I(X ; Y )− I(X ;Z1) (3.13)
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and
I(V ; Y )− I(V ;Z2)
= I(X ; Y )− I(X ;Z2)− [I(X ; Y |V )− I(X ;Z2|V )] (3.14)
≤ I(X ; Y )− I(X ;Z1) (3.15)
where (3.11) and (3.13) are due to the fact that Y is less noisy than Z1, and (3.15) is
due to the fact that Y is less noisy than Z2. Thus, without loss of generality, we may
set V = X and U to be constant in (3.9), which leads to a simpler characterization
of the secrecy capacity region that does not involve any auxiliary random variables.
We summarize this result in the following theorem.
Theorem 8. Consider a discrete memoryless two-level security wiretap channel with
transition probability p(y, z1, z2|x) where Z2 is degraded with respect to Z1 and Y is
less noisy than Z1. The secrecy capacity region of the channel is given by the set of
all nonnegative pairs (R1, R2) that satisfy
R1 ≤ I(X ; Y )− I(X ;Z1)
and R1 +R2 ≤ I(X ; Y )− I(X ;Z2)
(3.16)
for some input distribution p(x).
3. Proof of Theorem 5
As mentioned previously in Section 2, to prove Theorem 5, we only need to consider
the case where I(U ; Y |S) ≥ I(U ;Z2|S). To show that every rate pair (R1, R2) that
satisfies (3.3) for which I(U ; Y |S) ≥ I(U ;Z2|S) is achievable, we shall consider a
coding scheme that combines rate splitting, superposition coding, (nested) binning,
and prefix coding. Our code construction relies on a random-coding argument, which
can be described as follows.
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Fig. 7. Codebook structure for a coding scheme that combines rate splitting, super-
position coding, (nested) binning, and prefix coding.
Fix a joint auxiliary-input distribution p(s)(u|s)p(v|u)p(x|v) with I(U ; Y |S) ≥
I(U ;Z2|S) and ǫ > 0. Split the low-security message M2 into two independent sub-
messages M ′2 and M
′′
2 with rates R
′
2 and R
′′
2 , respectively.
Codebook generation. Our entire codebook consists of three layers: the S-
codebook as the bottom layer, the U -codebook as the middle layer, and the V -
codebook as the top layer. The S-codebook consists of a single length-n sequence
sn, generated according to an n-product of p(s).
Given sn, randomly and independently generate 2n(R
′
2+I(U ;Z2|S)+ǫ) codewords of
length n according to an n-product of p(u|s). Randomly partition the codewords into
2nR
′
2 bins so each bin contains 2n(I(U ;Z2|S)+ǫ) codewords. Label the codewords as unj,k
where j denotes the bin number, and k denotes the codeword number within each
bin. We shall refer to the codeword collection {unj,k}j,k as the U -codebook.
For each codeword unj,k in the U -codebook, randomly and independently generate
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2n(R1+R
′′
2+T ) codewords of length n according to an n-product of p(v|u). Randomly
partition the codewords into 2nR1 bins so each bin contains 2n(R
′′
2+T ) codewords. Fur-
ther partition each bin into 2nR
′′
2 subbins so each subbin contains 2nT codewords.
Label the codewords as vnj,k,l,p,q where (j, k) indicates the base codeword u
n
j,k from
which vnj,k,l,p,q was generated, l denotes the bin number, p denotes the subbin number
within each bin, and q denotes the codeword number within each subbin. We shall
refer to the codeword collection {vnj,k,l,p,q}l,p,q as the V -subcodebook corresponding to
the base codeword unj,k and {vnj,k,l,p,q}j,k,l,p,q as the V -codebook.
Once all three codebooks are chosen, they are revealed to all terminals. Fig. 7
illustrates the structure of the entire codebook.
Encoding. To send a message triple (m1, m
′
2, m
′′
2), the transmitter randomly (ac-
cording a uniform distribution) chooses a codeword unm′2,t2
from the m′2th bin in the
U -codebook. Once a unm′2,t2
is chosen, the transmitter looks into the corresponding
V -subcodebook {vnm′2,t2,l,p,q}l,p,q and randomly chooses a codeword v
n
m′2,t2,m1,m
′′
2 ,t1
from
the subbin identified by (m1, m
′′
2). Once a v
n
m′2,t2,m1,m
′′
2 ,t1
is chosen, an input sequence
xn is generated according to an n-product of p(x|v) and is then sent through the chan-
nel. Note that the sole codeword sn in the S-codebook simply serves as an “averaging
base” for the U - and V -codebooks and does not play any role in the encoding.
Decoding at the legitimate receiver. Given the channel outputs yn, the legitimate
receiver looks into the U -codebook and its V -subcodebooks and searches for a pair
of codewords (unj,k, v
n
j,k,l,p,q) such that (s
n, unj,k, v
n
j,k,l,p,q) is jointly typical [33] with y
n.
In the case when
R′2 + I(U ;Z2|S) + ǫ < I(U ; Y |S) (3.17)
and R1 +R
′′
2 + T < I(V ; Y |U) (3.18)
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with high probability the codeword pair selection (unm′2,t2
, vnm′2,t2,m1,m′′2 ,t1
) is the only
one that is jointly typical [33] with yn.
Security at the eavesdropper. To analyze the security of the high-security message
M1 and the submessage M
′′
2 at the eavesdropper, we shall assume (for now) that both
the submessage m′2 and the codeword selection u
n
m′2,t2
are known at the eavesdropper.
Note that such an assumption can only strengthen our security analysis. For any given
codeword un
m′2,t2
, the high security message M1 and the submessage M
′′
2 are encoded
using the corresponding V -subcodebook {vnm′2,t2,l,p,q}l,p,q. In particular, each bin in the
V -subcodebook corresponds to a message m1 and contains 2
n(R2+T ) codewords, each
randomly and independently generated according to an n-product of p(v|u). For a
given message m1, the transmitted codeword is randomly and uniformly chosen from
the corresponding bin (where the randomness is from both the submessage M ′′2 and
the transmitter’s choice of t). Following [4], in the case when
R′′2 + T > I(V ;Z1|U) (3.19)
we have
1
n
I(M1;Z
n
1 ,M
′
2)→ 0 (3.20)
in the limit as n → 0. From (3.20), we conclude that (1/n)I(M1;Zn1 ) → 0 in the
limit as n → ∞. Furthermore, each subbin in the V -subcodebook corresponds to a
message pair (m1, m
′′
2) and contains 2
nT codewords, each randomly and independently
generated according to an n-product of p(v|u). For a given message pair (m1, m′′2),
the transmitted codeword is randomly and uniformly chosen from the corresponding
subbin (where the randomness is from the transmitter’s choice of t). Again, following
[4], in the case when
T > I(V ;Z2|U) (3.21)
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we have
1
n
I(M1,M
′′
2 ;Z
n
2 ,M
′
2)→ 0 (3.22)
in the limit as n→ 0.
To analyze the security of the submessage M ′2, note that each bin in the U -
codebook corresponds to a submessage m′2 and contains 2
n(R′2+I(U ;Z2|S)+ǫ) codewords,
each randomly and independently generated according to an n-product of p(u|s). For
a given submessage m′2, the codeword u
n
m′2,t2
is randomly and uniformly chosen from
the corresponding bin (where the randomness is from the transmitter’s choice of t2).
Note from (3.21) that the rate of each V -subcodebook is greater than I(V ;Z2|U).
Following [34, Lemma 1], we have
1
n
I(M ′2;Z
n
2 )→ 0 (3.23)
in the limit as n → ∞. Putting together (3.22) and (3.23) and using the fact that
(M1,M
′′
2 ) and M
′
2 are independent, we have
1
n
I(M1,M2;Z
n
2 ) =
1
n
I(M1,M
′
2,M
′′
2 ;Z
n
2 ) (3.24)
=
1
n
I(M ′2;Z
n
2 ) +
1
n
I(M1,M
′′
2 ;Z
n
2 |M ′2) (3.25)
=
1
n
I(M ′2;Z
n
2 ) +
1
n
I(M1,M
′′
2 ;Z
n
2 ,M
′
2) (3.26)
which tends to zero in the limit as n→∞.
Finally, note that the overall communicate rate R2 of the low-security message
M2 is given by
R2 = R
′
2 +R
′′
2 . (3.27)
Eliminating T , R′2 and R
′′
2 from (3.17)–(3.19), (3.21), (3.27), and R
′
2, R
′′
2 ≥ 0 using
Fourier-Motzkin elimination, simplifying the results using the facts that 1) I(U ; Y |S) ≥
I(U ;Z2|S) by the assumption, 2) I(V ;Z2|U) ≤ I(V ;Z1|U) due to the Markov chain
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(U, V ) → Z1 → Z2, and 3) I(V ; Y |U) + I(U ; Y |S) = I(V, U ; Y |S) = I(V ; Y |S)
and I(V ;Z2|U) + I(U ;Z2|S) = I(V, U ;Z2|S) = I(V ;Z2|S) due to the Markov chain
S → U → V → X → (Y, Z1, Z2), and letting ǫ → 0, we conclude that any rate
pair (R1, R2) satisfying (3.3) for which I(U ; Y |S) ≥ I(U ;Z2|S) is achievable. This
completes the proof of Theorem 5.
C. Gaussian Two-Level Security Wiretap Channel
1. Scalar Channel
Consider a discrete-time two-level security wiretap channel with real input X and
outputs Y , Z1 and Z2 given by
Y =
√
aX +N1
Z1 =
√
b1X +N2
Z2 =
√
b2X +N3
(3.28)
where a, b1 and b2 are the corresponding channel gains, and N1, N2 and N3 are
additive white Gaussian noise with zero means and unit variances. Assume that
b1 ≥ b2 so the channel output Z2 is (stochastically) degraded with respect to Z1. The
channel input X is subject to the average power constraint (1.5).
We term the above communication scenario as (scalar) Gaussian two-level secu-
rity wiretap channel. The following theorem provides an explicit characterization of
the secrecy capacity region.
Theorem 9. Consider the (scalar) Gaussian two-level security wiretap channel (3.28)
where b1 ≥ b2, and the channel input X is subject to the average power constraint
(1.5). The secrecy capacity region of the channel is given by the collection of all
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nonnegative pairs (R1, R2) that satisfy
R1 ≤ Cs(P, a, b1)
and R1 +R2 ≤ Cs(P, a, b2)
(3.29)
where Cs(P, a, b) is defined as in (1.6).
Proof: Following the same argument as that for Fact 1, any achievable secrecy
rate pair (R1, R2) must satisfy (3.29). We may thus focus on the forward part of the
theorem.
To show that any nonnegative pair (R1, R2) that satisfies (3.29) is achievable,
let us first consider two simple cases. First, when b1 ≥ b2 ≥ a, both Cs(P, a, b1) and
Cs(P, a, b2) are equal to zero (c.f. definition (1.6)). So (3.29) does not include any
positive rate pairs and hence there is nothing to prove. Next, when b1 ≥ a ≥ b2,
Cs(P, a, b1) = 0 and (3.29) reduces to
R1 = 0
and R2 ≤ Cs(P, a, b2).
(3.30)
Since the high-security message M1 does not need to be transmitted, any rate pair
in this region can be achieved by using a scalar Gaussian wiretap code to encode the
low-security message M2. This has left us with the only case with a ≥ b1 ≥ b2.
For the case where a ≥ b1 ≥ b2, the channel output Y is less noisy than Z1. Thus,
the achievability of any rate pair in (3.29) follows from that of (3.16) by choosing X
to be Gaussian with zero mean and variance P . This completes the proof of the
theorem. 
The following corollary follows directly from the achievability of the corner point
(R1, R2) = (Cs(P, a, b1), Cs(P, a, b2)− Cs(P, a, b1)) (3.31)
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R1
R2
0
Cs(P, a, b1)
Cs(P, a, b2)
(Cs(P, a, b1), Cs(P, a, b2)− Cs(P, a, b1))
Fig. 8. Secrecy capacity region of the scalar Gaussian two-level security wiretap chan-
nel (a > b1 > b2). For comparison, the dashed line and the dotted line are the
boundary of the time-sharing and power-sharing rate regions, respectively.
of (3.29) and Fact 1. (Alternatively, it can also be proved from Theorem 5 by letting
V = X be Gaussian with zero mean and variance P , U = X · 1{a≤b1}, and S =
X · 1{a≤b2}, where 1A denotes the indicator function for event A.)
Corollary 10. Scalar Gaussian two-level security wiretap channels under an average
power constraint are perfectly embeddable.
Fig. 8 illustrates the secrecy capacity region (3.29) for the case where a > b1 > b2.
Also illustrated in the figure are the rate regions that can be achieved by time-
sharing and power-sharing between two secrecy codes that are separately designed for
the low-security and high-security messages. The time-sharing rate region includes
all nonnegative pairs (R1, R2) below the straight line connecting the corner points
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(Cs(P, a, b1), 0) and (0, Cs(P, a, b2)). The power-sharing rate region [29] includes all
nonnegative pairs (R1, R2) such that
R1 ≤ Cs(P1, a, b1)
R2 ≤ Cs(P, a, b2)− Cs(P1, a, b2)
(3.32)
for some P1 ∈ [0, P ]. Note that the corner point (3.31) is strictly outside the time-
sharing and power-sharing rate regions, illustrating the superiority of nested binning
over the separate coding schemes.
2. Independent Parallel Channel
Consider a discrete-time two-level security wiretap channel which consists of a bank
of L independent parallel scalar Gaussian two-level security wiretap channels. In this
model, the channel outputs are given by Y = (Y1, . . . , YL), Z1 = (Z1,1, . . . , Z1,L) and
Z2 = (Z2,1, . . . , Z2,L) where
Yl =
√
a1Xl +N1,l
Z1,l =
√
b1,lXl +N2,l
Z2,l =
√
b2,lXl +N3,l,
l = 1, . . . , L. (3.33)
Here, Xl is the channel input for the lth subchannel, al, b1,l and b2,l are the corre-
sponding channel gains in the lth subchannel, and N1,l, N2,l and N3,l are additive
white Gaussian noise with zero means and unit variances. We assume that b1,l ≥ b2,l
for all l = 1, . . . , L, so the channel output Z2 is (stochastically) degraded with re-
spect to Z1. Furthermore, (N1,l, N2,l, N3,l), l = 1, . . . , L, are independent so all L
subchannels are independent of each other.
We term the above communication scenario as independent parallel Gaussian
two-level security wiretap channel. The following theorem provides an explicit char-
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acterization of the secrecy capacity region under an average individual per-subchannel
power constraint.
Theorem 11. Consider the independent parallel Gaussian two-level security wiretap
channel (3.33) where b1,l ≥ b2,l for all l = 1, . . . , L, and the channel input X is subject
to the average individual per-subchannel power constraint (1.8). The secrecy capacity
region of the channel is given by the collection of all nonnegative pairs (R1, R2) that
satisfy
R1 ≤
∑L
l=1Cs(Pl, al, b1,l)
and R1 +R2 ≤
∑L
l=1Cs(Pl, al, b2,l)
(3.34)
where Cs(P, a, b) is defined as in (1.6).
Proof: We first prove the converse part of the theorem. Following the same
argument as that for Fact 1, we have
R1 ≤ Cs({Pl, al, b1,l}Ll=1)
and R1 +R2 ≤ Cs({Pl, al, b2,l}Ll=1)
(3.35)
for any achievable secrecy rate pair (R1, R2). By the secrecy capacity expression (1.10)
for the independent parallel Gaussian wiretap channel under an average individual
per-subchannel power constraint, we have
Cs({Pl, al, b1,l}Ll=1) =
∑L
l=1Cs(Pl, al, b1,l)
and Cs({Pl, al, b2,l}Ll=1) =
∑L
l=1Cs(Pl, al, b2,l).
(3.36)
Substituting (3.36) into (3.35) proves the converse part of the theorem.
To show that any nonnegative pair (R1, R2) that satisfies (3.34) is achievable,
let us consider independent coding over each of the L subchannels. Note that each
subchannel is a scalar Gaussian two-level security wiretap channel with average power
constraint Pl and channel gains (al, b1,l, b2,l). Thus, by Theorem 9, any nonnegative
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pair (R1,l, R2,l) that satisfies
R1,l ≤ Cs(Pl, al, b1,l)
and R1,l +R2,l ≤ Cs(Pl, al, b2,l)
(3.37)
is achievable for the lth subchannel. The overall communication rates are given by
R1 =
∑L
l=1R1,l
and R2 =
∑L
l=1R2,l.
(3.38)
Substituting (3.37) into (3.38) proves that any nonnegative pair (R1, R2) that satisfies
(3.34) is achievable. This completes the proof of the theorem. 
Similar to the scalar case, the following corollary is an immediate consequence
of Theorem 11.
Corollary 12. Independent parallel Gaussian two-level security wiretap channels un-
der an average individual per-subchannel power constraint are perfectly embeddable.
The secrecy capacity region of the channel under an average total power con-
straint is summarized in the following corollary. The results follow from the well-
known fact that an average total power constraint can be written as the union of
average individual per-subchannel power constraints, where the union is over all pos-
sible power allocations among the subchannels.
Corollary 13. Consider the independent parallel Gaussian two-level security wiretap
channel (3.33) where b1,l ≥ b2,l for all l = 1, . . . , L, and the channel input X is subject
to the average total power constraint (1.9). The secrecy capacity region of the channel
is given by the collection of all nonnegative pairs (R1, R2) that satisfy
R1 ≤
∑L
l=1Cs(Pl, al, b1,l)
and R1 +R2 ≤
∑L
l=1Cs(Pl, al, b2,l)
(3.39)
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Fig. 9. Secrecy capacity region of the independent parallel Gaussian two-level security
wiretap channel under an average total power constraint. The intersection of
the dashed lines are outside the secrecy capacity region, indicating that the
channel is not perfectly embeddable.
for some power allocation (P1, . . . , PL) such that
∑L
l=1 Pl ≤ P .
Fig. 9 illustrates the secrecy capacity region with L = 2 subchannels where
a1 = 1.000, b1,1 = 0.800, b2,1 = 0.100
a2 = 1.000, b1,2 = 0.250, b2,2 = 0.100
and P = 1.000.
As we can see, under the average total power constraint (1.9), the independent par-
allel Gaussian two-level security wiretap channel is embeddable but not perfectly
embeddable. The reason is that the optimal power allocation (P1, P2) that maxi-
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mizes Cs(P1, a1, b2,1) + Cs(P2, a2, b2,2) is suboptimal in maximizing Cs(P1, a1, b1,1) +
Cs(P2, a2, b1,2). By comparison, under the average individual per-subchannel power
constraint (1.8), the power allocated to each of the subchannels is fixed so the channel
is always perfectly embeddable.
D. Two-Level Security Wiretap Channel II
In Chapter I we briefly summarized the known results on a classical secrecy com-
munication setting known as wiretap channel. A closely related classical secrecy
communication scenario is wiretap channel II, which was first studied by Ozarow
and Wyner [32]. In the wiretap channel II setting, the transmitter sends a binary
sequence Xn = (X1, . . . , Xn) of length n noiselessly to an legitimate receiver. The
signal Zn = (Z1, . . . , Zn) received at the eavesdropper is given by
Zi =


Xi, i ∈ S
e, otherwise
(3.40)
where e represents an erasure output, and S is a subset of {1, . . . , n} of size nα repre-
senting the locations of the transmitted bits that can be accessed by the eavesdropper.
If the subset S is known at the transmitter, a message M of n(1 − α) bits can
be noiselessly communicated to the legitimate receiver through XSc := {Xi : i ∈
Sc}. Since the eavesdropper has no information regarding to XSc , perfectly secure
communication is achieved without any coding. It is easy to see that in this scenario,
n(1 − α) is also the maximum number of bits that can be reliably and perfectly
securely communicated through n transmitted bits.
An interesting result of [32] is that for any ǫ > 0, a total of n(1 − α − ǫ) bits
can be reliably and asymptotically perfectly securely communicated to the legitimate
receiver even when the subset S is unknown (but with a fixed size nα) a priori at the
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transmitter. Here, by “asymptotically perfectly securely” we mean (1/n)I(M ;Zn)→
0 in the limit as n→∞. Unlike the case where the subset S is known a priori, coding
is necessary when S is unknown at the transmitter. In particular, [32] considered a
random binning scheme that partitions the collection of all length-n binary sequences
into an appropriately chosen group code and its cosets. For the wiretap channel
setting, as shown in Section B, a random binning scheme can be easily modified into
a nested binning scheme to efficiently embed high-security bits into low-security ones.
The main goal of this section is to extend this result from the classical setting of
wiretap channel to wiretap channel II.
More specifically, assume that a realization of the subset S has two possible sizes,
nα1 and nα2, where 1 ≥ α1 ≥ α2 ≥ 0. The transmitter has two independent messages,
the high-security messageM1 and the low-security messageM2, uniformly drawn from
{1, . . . , 2nR1} and {1, . . . , 2nR2} respectively. When the size of the realization S is nα2,
both messagesM1 andM2 need to be secure, i.e., (1/n)I(M1,M2;Z
n)→ 0 in the limit
as n→∞. In addition, when the size of the realization of S is nα1, the high-security
message M1 needs to remain secure, i.e., (1/n)I(M1;Z
n)→ 0 in the limit as n→∞.
We term this communication scenario as two-level security wiretap channel II, in line
with our previous terminology in Section B.
By the results of [32], without needing to communicate the low-security message
M2, the maximum achievable R1 is 1−α1. Without the additional secrecy constraint
(1/n)I(M1;Z
n) → 0 on the high-security message M1, the messages (M1,M2) can
be viewed as a single message M with rate R1 + R2, and the maximum achievable
R1 + R2 is 1 − α2. The main result of this section is to show that the rate pair
(1 − α1, α1 − α2) is indeed achievable, from which we may conclude that two-level
security wiretap channels II are perfectly embeddable. Moreover, perfect embedding
can be achieved by a nested binning scheme that uses a two-level coset code. The
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results are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 14. Two-level security wiretap channels II are perfectly embeddable. More-
over, perfect embedding can be achieved by a nested binning scheme that uses a two-
level coset code.
Proof: Fix ǫ > 0. Consider a binary parity-check matrix
H =

 H1
H2


where the size of H1 is n(1−α1− ǫ)×n and the size of H2 is n(α1−α2)×n. Let s1(·)
be a one-on-one mapping between {1, . . . , 2n(1−α1−ǫ)} and the binary vectors of length
n(1−α1− ǫ), and let s2(·) be a one-on-one mapping between M2 ∈ {1, . . . , 2n(α1−α2)}
and the binary vectors of length n(α1 − α2).
For a given message pair (m1, m2), the transmitter randomly (according to a
uniform distribution) chooses a solution xn to the linear equations
(xn)tH = (xn)t

 H1
H2

 =

 s1(m1)
s2(m2)

 (3.41)
and sends it to the legitimate receiver.
When the parity-check matrix H has full (row) rank, the above encoding pro-
cedure is equivalent of a nested binning scheme that partitions the collection of all
length-n binary sequences into bins and subbins using a two-level coset code with
parity-check matrices (H1, H2). Moreover, let b1, . . . , bn be the columns of H and
let Γ ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. Define D2(Γ) as the dimension of the subspace spanned by
{bi : i ∈ Γ} and
D∗2 := min
|Γ|=n(1−α2)
D2(Γ). (3.42)
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When the size of the realization of S is nα2, by [32, Lemma 4] we have
H(M1,M2|Zn) = D∗2. (3.43)
Note that the low-security message M2 is uniformly drawn from {1, . . . , 2n(α1−α2)}.
So by (3.41), for a given high-security message m1, the transmitted sequence x
n is
randomly chosen (according to a uniform distribution) as a solution to the linear
equations (xn)tH1 = s1(m1). If we let a1, . . . , an be the columns of H1 and define
D∗1 := min
|Γ|=n(1−α1)
D1(Γ) (3.44)
where D1(Γ) is the dimension of the subspace spanned by {ai : i ∈ Γ}, we have again
from [32, Lemma 4]
H(M1|Zn) = D∗1 (3.45)
when the size of the realization of S is nα1.
Let Ψ(H) = 1 when we have either H does not have full rank, or D∗2 < n(1 −
α2 − ǫ)− 3/ǫ, or D∗1 < n(1− α1 − ǫ)− 3/ǫ, and let Ψ(H) = 0 otherwise. By using a
randomized argument that generates the entries of H independently according to a
uniform distribution in {0, 1}, we can show that there exists an H with Ψ(H) = 0 for
sufficiently large n (see Appendix C for details). For such an H , we have from (3.43)
and (3.45) that (1/n)I(M1,M2;Z
n) ≤ 3/(nǫ) when the size of the realization of S is
nα2, and (1/n)I(M1;Z
n) ≤ 3/(nǫ) when the size of the realization of S is nα1.
Letting n → ∞ and ǫ → 0 (in that order) proves the achievability of the rate
pair (1− α1, α1 − α2) and hence completes the proof of the theorem. 
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E. Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we considered the problem of simultaneously communicating two mes-
sages, a high-security message and a low-security message, to a legitimate receiver,
referred to as the security embedding problem. An information-theoretic formulation
of the problem was presented. With appropriate coding architectures, it was shown
that a significant portion of the information bits can receive additional security pro-
tections without sacrificing the overall rate of communication. The key to achieving
efficient embedding was to use the low-security message as part of the transmitter
randomness to protect the high-security message when the eavesdropper channel re-
alization is strong.
For the engineering communication scenarios with real channel input and additive
white Gaussian noise, it was shown that the high-security message can be embedded
into the low-security message at full rate without incurring any loss on the overall
rate of communication for both scalar and independent parallel Gaussian channels
(under an average individual per-subchannel power constraint). The scenarios with
multiple transmit and receive antennas are considerably more complex and hence
require further investigations.
Finally, note that even though in this chapter we have only considered providing
two levels of security protections to the information bits, most of the results extend
to multiple-level security in the most straightforward fashion. In the limit scenario
when the security levels change continuously, the number of secure bits delivered to
the legitimate receiver would depend on the realization of the eavesdropper channel
even though such realizations are unknown a priori at the transmitter.
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CHAPTER IV
SECURE SYMMETRICAL MULTILEVEL DIVERSITY CODING
A. Introduction
Symmetrical Multilevel Diversity Coding (SMDC) is a source coding problem with L
independent discrete memoryless sources (S1, . . . , SL), where the importance of the
sources is assumed to decrease with the subscript l. The sources are to be encoded
by a total of L encoders, where the rate of the lth encoder output is Rl. The decoder
can access a subset U ⊆ ΩL := {1, . . . , L} of the encoder outputs. Which subset of
the encoder outputs is available at the decoder is unknown a priori at the encoders.
However, no matter which subset U actually realizes, the sources (S1, . . . , Sm) need
to be asymptotically perfectly reconstructed at the decoder whenever |U | ≥ m. Note
that the word “symmetrical” here refers to the fact that the sources that need to be
reconstructed at the decoder depend on the available subset of the encoder outputs
only via its cardinality. The rate allocations at different encoders, however, can be
different and are not necessarily symmetrical.
The problem of Multilevel Diversity Coding (MDC) was introduced by Roche
[35] and Yeung [36] in the early 1990s. In particular, [36] considered the simple
coding strategy of separately encoding different sources at the encoders, subsequently
referred to as superposition coding. The aforementioned SMDC problem was first
systematically studied in [37], where it was shown that superposition coding can
achieve the minimum sum rate for the general SMDC problem (with an arbitrary total
number of encoders L) and the entire admissible rate region with L = 3 encoders.
The problem regarding whether superposition coding can achieve the entire admissible
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rate region for the general SMDC problem, however, remained open. Finally, in a
very elegant (albeit highly technical) paper [38], Yeung and Zhang resolved the open
problem by positive through the so-called α-resolution method.
Recent years have seen a flurry of research on information-theoretic security. See
[7] and [8] for surveys of recent progress in this field. Motivated by this renewed
interest, in this chapter we consider the problem of Secure Symmetrical Multilevel
Diversity Coding (S-SMDC) in the presence of an additional eavesdropper. Specifi-
cally, a collection of L − N independent discrete memoryless sources (S1, . . . , SL−N)
are to be encoded by a total of L encoders, where the rate of the lth encoder output
is Rl. A legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper can access a subset U ⊆ ΩL and
A ⊆ ΩL of the encoder outputs, respectively. Which subsets of the encoder outputs
are available at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are unknown a priori at
the encoders. However, no matter which subsets U and A actually occur, the sources
(S1, . . . , Sk) need to be asymptotically perfectly reconstructed at the legitimate re-
ceiver whenever |U | ≥ N + k, and the entire collection of the sources (S1, . . . , SL−N)
needs to be kept perfectly secret from the eavesdropper as long as |A| ≤ N . As
before, the word “symmetrical” here refers to the access structure at the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper, but not to the rate allocations at different encoders.
We envision that such a communication scenario is useful for designing distributed
information storage systems [35] where information retrieval needs to be both robust
and secure.
As mentioned previously, separate encoding of different sources (superposition
coding) can achieve the entire admissible rate region for the general SMDC problem
without any secrecy constraints [38]. It is thus natural to ask whether the same sepa-
rate encoding strategy would remain optimal for the general S-SMDC problems. For
the classical SMDC problems without any secrecy constraints, the problem of efficient
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encoding of individual sources is essentially to transmit the source over an erasure
channel and is well understood based on the earlier work of Singleton [39]. For the
S-SMDC problems, however, the problem of efficient encoding of individual sources
is closely related to the problem of secure coding over a Wiretap Network (WN)
[40], which, in its most general setting, is a very challenging problem in information-
theoretic security.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section B, we focus on the
problem of encoding individual sources, i.e., Secure Symmetrical Single-level Diversity
Coding (S-SSDC). By leveraging the results of [40] on secure coding over a three-layer
WN and utilizing some basic polyhedral structure of the admissible rate region, we
provide a precise characterization of the entire admissible rate region for the general
S-SSDC problem. Building on this result, in Section C we show that superposition
coding can achieve the minimum sum rate for the general S-SMDC problem. Finally,
in Section D we conclude the chapter with some remarks.
B. Secure Symmetrical Single-Level Diversity Coding
1. Problem Statement
Let {S[t]}∞t=1 be a discrete memoryless source with time index t and let Sn :=
(S[1], . . . , S[n]). An (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem consists of a set of L encoders, a
legitimate receiver who has access to a subset U ⊆ ΩL of the encoder outputs, and
an eavesdropper who has access to a subset A ⊆ ΩL of the encoder outputs. Which
subsets of the encoder outputs are available at the legitimate receiver and the eaves-
dropper are unknown a priori at the encoders. However, no matter which subsets U
and A actually occur, the legitimate receiver must be able to asymptotically perfectly
reconstruct the source whenever |U | ≥ m, and the source must be kept perfectly secret
68
from the eavesdropper as long as |A| ≤ N . Obviously, reliable and secure communi-
cation of the source is possible only when m > N .
Formally, an (n, (M1, . . . ,ML)) code is defined by a collection of L encoding
functions
el : Sn ×K → {1, . . . ,Ml}, ∀l = 1, . . . , L (4.1)
and decoding functions
dU :
∏
l∈U
{1, . . . ,Ml} → Sn, ∀U ⊆ ΩL s.t. |U | ≥ m. (4.2)
Here, K denotes the key space accessible to all L encoders. There are no limitations
on the size of the key space K. However, the secret key is only shared by the encoders,
but not with the legitimate receiver or the eavesdropper. A nonnegative rate tuple
(R1, . . . , RL) is said to be admissible if for every ǫ > 0, there exists, for sufficiently
large block length n, an (n, (M1, . . . ,ML)) code such that:
• (Rate constraints)
1
n
logMl ≤ Rl + ǫ, ∀l = 1, . . . , L; (4.3)
• (Asymptotically perfect reconstruction at the legitimate receiver)
Pr{dU(XU) 6= Sn} ≤ ǫ, ∀U ⊆ ΩL s.t. |U | ≥ m (4.4)
where Xl := el(S
n, K) is the output of the lth encoder, K is the secret key
shared by all L encoders, and XU := {Xl : l ∈ U}; and
• (Perfect secrecy at the eavesdropper)
H(Sn|XA) = H(Sn), ∀A ⊆ ΩL s.t. |A| ≤ N (4.5)
i.e., observing the encoder outputs XA does not provide any information re-
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garding to the source sequence Sn.
The admissible rate region R is the collection of all admissible rate tuples
(R1, . . . , RL). The minimum sum rate Rms is defined as
Rms := min
(R1,...,RL)∈R
L∑
l=1
Rl. (4.6)
2. Main Results
The following lemma provides a simple outer bound on the admissible rate region of
the general S-SSDC problem. Let R(L, k,H) be the collection of all nonnegative rate
tuples (R1, . . . , RL) satisfying
∑
l∈D
Rl ≥ H, ∀D ∈ Ω(k)L (4.7)
where Ω
(k)
L is the collection of all subsets of ΩL of size k.
Lemma 1. For any (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem, the admissible rate region
R ⊆ R(L,m−N,H(S)). (4.8)
Lemma 1 can be proved using standard information-theoretic techniques. For
completeness, a proof is included in Appendix D. The above outer bound is known
to be tight in the following two special cases:
1) When N = 0, the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem reduces to the classical (L,m)
SSDC problem without any secrecy constraints, for which the admissible rate
region is known [39] to be R(L,m,H(S)).
2) With N > 0 but m = N + 1, a collection D of the encoder outputs will
either lead to an asymptotically perfect reconstruction of the source (whenever
|D| ≥ N + 1), or provide zero information on the source (whenever |D| ≤ N).
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In this case, the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem reduces to the classical (L,N)
threshold secret sharing problem, for which the admissible rate region is known
[41, 42] to be R(L, 1, H(S)).
The main result of this section is that the outer bound R(L,m − N,H(S)) is
in fact the admissible rate region for the general S-SSDC problem, as summarized in
the following theorem.
Theorem 15. For any (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem, the admissible rate region
R = R(L,m−N,H(S)). (4.9)
A proof of the theorem is provided in Section 3. To show that every rate tuple
in R(L,m − N,H(S)) is admissible, our proof proceeds in the following two steps.
First, we show that for any (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem, the symmetrical rate tuple
(H(S)/(m−N), . . . , H(S)/(m−N)) is admissible. In our proof, this is accomplished
by relating the S-SSDC problem to the problem of secure coding over a three-layer
WN and using the result of [40, Theorem 3] on an achievable secrecy rate for the
generic WN. Building on the previous result, next we show that every rate tuple in
R(L,m − N,H(S)) is admissible via an induction argument (inducting on the total
number of encoders L) and the following polyhedral structure of R(L, k,H).
Proposition 3. R(L, k,H) is a pointed polyhedron in RL with the following structural
properties:
1) The characteristic cone of R(L, k,H) is given by {(R1, . . . , RL) : Rl ≥ 0, ∀l =
1, . . . , L}.
2) Among all corner points (vertices) of R(L, k,H), (H/k, . . . , H/k) is the only
one with all strictly positive entries (if there exists any).
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3) For any l = 1, . . . , L, the Rl = 0 slice of R(L, k,H) is isomorphic to R(L −
1, k− 1, H). In particular, the RL = 0 slice of R(L, k,H) is identical to R(L−
1, k − 1, H), i.e.,
{(R1, . . . , RL−1) : (R1, . . . , RL−1, 0) ∈ R(L, k,H)} = R(L−1, k−1, H). (4.10)
Proof. Property 1 follows directly from the definition of characteristic cone [43, Lec-
ture 2]. Property 2 is due to the fact that
(R1, . . . , RL) = (H/k, . . . , H/k) (4.11)
is a solution to the equations
∑
l∈D
Rl = H, ∀D ∈ Ω(k)L . (4.12)
To see property 3, note that the Rl = 0 slice of R(L, k,H) is given by all
nonnegative rate tuples (R1, . . . , Rl−1, Rl+1, . . . , RL) satisfying
∑
d∈D
Rd ≥ H, ∀D ∈ Ω(k−1)L\{l} ∪ Ω(k)L\{l} (4.13)
where Ω
(k)
L\{l} denotes all subsets of ΩL \ {l} of size k. Since every inequality with
D ∈ Ω(k)
L\{l} is dominated by every inequality with D
′ ∈ Ω(k−1)
L\{l} and such that D
′ ⊆ D,
we have the desired property.
Fig. 10 illustrates the above polyhedral structure of R(L, k,H) for L = 2 and 3.
The following corollary summarizes the minimum sum rate for the general S-SSDC
problem.
Corollary 16. For any (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem, the minimum sum rate
Rms =
L
m−NH(S). (4.14)
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(a) L = 2, m = 2, N = 1 (b) L = 3, m = 3, N = 1
Fig. 10. The rate region R(L, k,H) for L = 2 and 3. The Rl = 0 slices of R(3, 2, H)
are isomorphic to R(2, 1, H).
Proof. Let us first verify that
min
(R1,...,RL)∈R(L,k,H)
L∑
l=1
Rl =
L
k
H. (4.15)
For any rate tuple (R1, . . . , RL) ∈ R(L, k,H), we have
∑
l∈D
Rl ≥ H, ∀D ∈ Ω(k)L . (4.16)
Summing over all D ∈ Ω(k)L gives
∑
D∈Ω
(k)
L
∑
l∈D
Rl =

 L− 1
k − 1

 L∑
l=1
Rl ≥

 L
k

H. (4.17)
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We thus have
L∑
l=1
Rl ≥

 L
k



 L− 1
k − 1


H =
L
k
H (4.18)
for any rate tuple (R1, . . . , RL) ∈ R(L, k,H). On the other hand, note that the
symmetrical rate tuple
(H/k, . . . , H/k) ∈ R(L, k,H) (4.19)
so
min
(R1,...,RL)∈R(L,k,H)
L∑
l=1
Rl ≤ L
k
H. (4.20)
Combining (4.18) and (4.20) completes the proof of (4.15).
Now by Theorem 15,
Rms = min
(R1,...,RL)∈R
L∑
l=1
Rl = min
(R1,...,RL)∈R(L,m−N,H(S))
L∑
l=1
Rl =
L
m−NH(S). (4.21)
This completes the proof of the corollary.
3. Proof of Theorem 15
Let us first show that the symmetrical rate tuple (H(S)/(m−N), . . . , H(S)/(m−N))
is admissible by considering the following simple source-channel separation scheme
for the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem:
• First compress the source sequence Sn into a source message W using a fixed-
length lossless source code. It is well known [33, Chapter 3.2] that the rate R of
the source message W can be made arbitrarily close to the entropy rate H(S)
for sufficiently large block length n.
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• Next, the source messageW is delivered to the legitimate receiver using a secure
(L,N,m, (R1, . . . , RL))
WN code.
The problem of secure coding over a WN was formally introduced in [40]. A
generic WN (G, s,U ,A) consists of a directed acyclic network G, a source node s, a
set of user nodes U , and a collection of sets of wiretapped edges A. Each member of A
may be fully accessed by an eavesdropper, but no eavesdropper may access more than
one member of A. The source node has access to a message W , which is intended for
all user nodes in U but needs to be kept perfectly secret from the eavesdroppers. The
maximum achievable secrecy rate for W is called the secrecy capacity of the WN and
is denoted by Cs(G, s,U ,A).
An (L,N,m, (R1, . . . , RL)) WN is a special WN with three layers of nodes: top,
middle, and bottom. As illustrated in Fig. 11, the only node in the top layer is the
source node s. There are L intermediate nodes in the middle layer, each corresponding
to an encoder in the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem. For each l = 1, . . . , L, the source
node s is connected to the intermediate node l by a channel (s, l) with capacity Rl.
There are
|U| =

 L
m

 (4.22)
user nodes in the bottom layer, each corresponding to a possible realization of the
legitimate receiver in the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem and is connected to m interme-
diate nodes through m infinite-capacity channels. Finally, the collection of sets of
wiretapped edges A is defined as
A :=
{
{(s, l)|l ∈ A} : A ∈ Ω(N)L
}
(4.23)
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u1 u|U|
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R1
W
Wˆ Wˆ
R2 RL−1 RL
Fig. 11. The (L,N,m, (R1, . . . , RL)) wiretap network.
where each set of wiretapped edges in A corresponds to a possible realization of the
eavesdropper in the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem.
Based on the aforementioned connection between the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem
and the problem of secure coding over the (L,N,m, (R1, . . . , RL)) WN, we have the
following simple lemma.
Lemma 2. A nonnegative rate tuple (R1, . . . , RL) is admissible for the (L,N,m) S-
SSDC problem if the entropy rate of the source is less than or equal to the secrecy
capacity of the (L,N,m, (R1, . . . , RL)) WN, i.e.,
H(S) ≤ Cs(L,N,m, (R1, . . . , RL)). (4.24)
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In general, characterizing the exact secrecy capacity of a WN can be very difficult.
For a generic WN (G, s,U ,A), the following secrecy rate
Rs = min
u∈U ,A∈A
[mincut(s, u)−mincut(s, A)] (4.25)
is known [40] to be achievable. Here, mincut(s, u) denotes the value of a minimum
cut between the source node s and the user node u, and mincut(s, A) denotes the
value of a minimum cut between the source node s and the set of wiretapped edges
A. For the (L,N,m, (H(S)/(m−N), . . . , H(S)/(m−N))) WN, it is straightforward
to verify that
mincut(s, u) =
m
m−NH(S), ∀u ∈ U (4.26)
and
mincut(s, A) =
N
m−NH(S), ∀A ∈ A. (4.27)
Hence, the secrecy rate
Rs =
m
m−NH(S)−
N
m−NH(S) = H(S) (4.28)
is achievable for the (L,N,m, (H(S)/(m − N), . . . , H(S)/(m − N))) WN. We sum-
marize this result in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For any (L,N,m, (H(S)/(m−N), . . . , H(S)/(m−N))) WN, the secrecy
capacity can be bounded from below as
Cs(L,N,m, (H(S)/(m−N), . . . , H(S)/(m−N))) ≥ H(S). (4.29)
Combining Lemmas 2 and 3 proves the admissibility of the symmetrical rate
tuple (H(S)/(m−N), . . . , H(S)/(m−N)) .
Building on the previous result, next we show that every rate tuple in R(L,m−
N,H(S)) is admissible. By Proposition 3, R(L,m−N,H(S)) is a pointed polyhedron
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with the characteristic cone given by {(R1, . . . , RL) : Rl ≥ 0, ∀l = 1, . . . , L}. Thus,
to show that all rate tuples in R(L,m − N,H(S)) are admissible, it is sufficient to
show that all corner points of R(L,m−N,H(S)) are admissible.
We shall consider proof by induction, where the induction is on the total number
of encoders L. First consider the base case with L = 2. When L = 2, there is only
one nontrivial (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem: the (2, 1, 2) S-SSDC problem. Note that
the rate region R(2, 1, H(S)) has only one corner point: the symmetrical rate pair
(H(S), H(S)), whose admissibility has already been established. We thus conclude
that every rate tuple in R(2, 1, H(S)) is admissible for the (2, 1, 2) S-SSDC problem.
Now assume that for every nontrivial (L − 1, N ′, m′) S-SSDC problem, all rate
tuples in R(L′, m′ − N ′, H(S)) are admissible. Based on this assumption, next we
show that all corner points of R(L,m − N,H(S)) are admissible for the (L,N,m)
S-SSDC problem. We shall consider the corner points with all strictly positive entries
(it they exist) and those with at least one zero entry separately:
1) By Proposition 3, the symmetrical rate tuple (H(S)/(m−N), . . . , H(S)/(m−
N)) is the only corner point of R(L,m − N,H(S)) with all strictly positive
entries (if it exists), whose admissibility has already been established.
2) To prove the admissibility of the corner points of R(L,m − N,H(S)) with at
least one zero entry, by the symmetry of the rate region R(L,m − N,H(S))
we may consider without loss of generality those with RL = 0. Note that if an
(n, (M1, . . . ,ML−1)) code satisfies both asymptotically perfect reconstruction
constraint (4.4) and the perfect secrecy constraint (4.5) for the (L− 1, N,m−
1) S-SSDC problem, an (n, (M1, . . . ,ML−1, 1)) code with the same encoding
functions for encoders 1 to L−1 (encoder L uses a constant encoding function)
also satisfies (trivially) both constraints for the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem.
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Thus, if (R1, . . . , RL−1) is an admissible rate tuple for the (L − 1, N,m − 1)
S-SSDC problem, then (R1, . . . , RL−1, 0) is also an admissible rate tuple for the
(L,N,m) S-SSDC problem. By the induction assumption, all rate tuples in
R(L − 1, m − N − 1, H(S)) are admissible for the (L − 1, N,m − 1) problem.
Combined with Proposition 3, this implies that all rate tuples in
{(R1, . . . , RL−1, 0) : (R1, . . . , RL−1) ∈ R(L− 1, m−N − 1, H(S))}
= {(R1, . . . , RL) ∈ R(L,m−N,H(S)) : RL = 0}
(4.30)
i.e., the RL = 0 slice of R(L,m − N,H(S)), are admissible for the (L,N,m)
S-SSDC problem. As a special case, all corner points of R(L,m − N,H(S))
with RL = 0 are admissible for the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem.
Combining Steps 1 and 2 proves that all corner points of R(L,m − N,H(S))
are admissible. We thus conclude that all rate tuples in R(L,m − N,H(S)) are
admissible. This completes the induction step and hence the proof of the theorem.
C. Secure Symmetrical Multilevel Diversity Coding
1. Problem Statement
Let {S1[t], . . . , SL−N [t]}∞t=1 be a collection of L−N independent discrete memoryless
sources with time index t and let Snk := (Sk[1], . . . , Sk[n]). An (L,N) S-SMDC prob-
lem consists of a set of L encoders, a legitimate receiver who has access to a subset U
of the encoder outputs, and an eavesdropper who has access to a subset A of the en-
coder outputs. Which subsets of the encoder outputs are available at the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper are unknown a priori at the encoders. However, no
matter which subsets U and A actually occur, the legitimate receiver must be able to
asymptotically perfectly reconstruct the sources (S1, . . . , Sk) whenever |U | = N + k,
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and all sources (S1, . . . , SL−N) must be kept perfectly secure from the eavesdropper
as long as |A| ≤ N .
Formally, an (n, (M1, . . . ,ML)) code is defined by a collection of L encoding
functions
el :
L−N∏
k=1
Snk ×K → {1, . . . ,Ml}, ∀l = 1, . . . , L (4.31)
and decoding functions
dU :
∏
l∈U
{1, . . . ,Ml} →
|U |−N∏
k=1
Snk , ∀U ⊆ ΩL s.t. |U | ≥ N + 1. (4.32)
Here, K is the key space accessible to all L encoders. A nonnegative rate tuple
(R1, . . . , RL) is said to be admissible if for every ǫ > 0, there exits, for sufficiently
large block length n, an (n, (M1, . . . ,ML)) code such that:
• (Rate constraints)
1
n
logMl ≤ Rl + ǫ, ∀l = 1, . . . , L; (4.33)
• (Asymptotically perfect reconstruction at the legitimate receiver)
Pr{dU(XU) 6= (Sn1 , . . . , Sn|U |−N)} ≤ ǫ, ∀U ⊆ ΩL s.t. |U | ≥ N + 1 (4.34)
where Xl := el((S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
L−N), K) is the output of the lth encoder, K is the
secret key shared by all L encoders, and XU := {Xl : l ∈ U}; and
• (Perfect secrecy at the eavesdropper)
H(Sn1 , . . . , S
n
L−N |XA) = H(Sn1 , . . . , SnL−N), ∀A ⊆ ΩL s.t. |A| ≤ N (4.35)
i.e., observing the encoder outputs XA does not provide any information re-
garding to the source sequences (Sn1 , . . . , S
n
L−N).
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2. Main Results
Motivated by the success of [36, 37, 38] on the classical SMDC problem without any
secrecy constraints, here we focus on superposition coding where the output of the
lth encoder Xl is given by
Xl =
(
X
(1)
l , . . . , X
(L−N)
l
)
(4.36)
and X
(k)
l is the coded message for source Sk at the lth encoder using an (L,N,N +k)
S-SSDC code. Note here that all sources are encoded separately at the encoders, and
there is no coding across different sources. Thus, if (R
(k)
1 , . . . , R
(k)
L ) is an admissible
rate tuple for the (L,N,N + k) S-SSDC problem with source Sk, then the rate tuple
(R1, . . . , RL) =
(
L−N∑
k=1
R
(k)
1 , . . . ,
L−N∑
k=1
R
(k)
L
)
(4.37)
is admissible for the (L,N) S-SMDC problem.
By Corollary 16, the minimum sum rate for the (L,N,N + k) S-SSDC problem
with source Sk is given by (L/k)H(Sk). It follows that
∑L−N
k=1 (L/k)H(Sk) is the
minimum sum rate that can be achieved by superposition coding for the (L,N) S-
SMDC problem. The main result of this section is that
∑L−N
k=1 (L/k)H(Sk) is in fact
the minimum sum rate that can be achieved by any coding scheme for the (L,N)
S-SMDC problem. Thus, superposition coding is optimal in terms of achieving the
minimum sum rate for the general S-SMDC problem. We summarize this result in
the following theorem.
Theorem 17. Superposition coding can achieve the minimum sum rate for the general
(L,N) S-SMDC problem, which is given by
Rms =
L−N∑
k=1
L
k
H(Sk). (4.38)
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A proof of the theorem is provided in Section 3. The proof uses an induction
argument and is built on the classical subset inequality of Han [33, Chapter 17.6] and
the following key proposition.
Proposition 4. For any (n, (M1, . . . ,ML)) code that satisfies both asymptotically
perfect reconstruction constraint (4.34) and the perfect secrecy constraint (4.35), we
have
H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snk−1, XA) ≥ nH(Sk) +H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snk , XA)− nδk(n, ǫ) (4.39)
where
δk(n, ǫ) := 1/n+ ǫ
k∑
α=1
log |Sα| (4.40)
for any A ∈ Ω(N)L and D ∈ Ω(k)L such that A ∩D = ∅ and any k = 1, . . . , L−N .
3. Proof of the Main Results
Let us first prove Proposition 4. Since |A| = N , |D| = k, and A ∩ D = ∅, we have
|D ∪ A| = N + k. For any (n, (M1, . . . ,ML)) code that satisfies both asymptotically
perfect reconstruction constraint (4.34) and the perfect secrecy constraint (4.35), we
have by Fano’s inequality
H(Sn1 , . . . , S
n
k |XD, XA) ≤ nδk(n, ǫ) (4.41)
and
H(Sn1 , . . . , S
n
k |XA) = H(Sn1 , . . . , Snk ). (4.42)
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Thus,
H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snk−1, XA) + nδk(n, ǫ)
≥ H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snk−1, XA) +H(Sn1 , . . . , Snk |XD, XA) (4.43)
≥ H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snk−1, XA) +H(Snk |Sn1 , . . . , Snk−1, XD, XA) (4.44)
= H(XD, S
n
k |Sn1 , . . . , Snk−1, XA) (4.45)
= H(Snk |Sn1 , . . . , Snk−1, XA) +H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snk , XA) (4.46)
= H(Sn1 , . . . , S
n
k |XA)−H(Sn1 , . . . , Snk−1|XA)
+H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snk , XA) (4.47)
= H(Sn1 , . . . , S
n
k )−H(Sn1 , . . . , Snk−1|XA)
+H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snk , XA) (4.48)
≥ H(Sn1 , . . . , Snk )−H(Sn1 , . . . , Snk−1) +H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snk , XA) (4.49)
= H(Snk |Sn1 , . . . , Snk−1) +H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snk , XA) (4.50)
= H(Snk ) +H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snk , XA) (4.51)
= nH(Sk) +H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snk , XA) (4.52)
where (4.43) follows from (4.41), (4.48) follows from (4.42), (4.49) follows from the
fact that conditioning reduces entropy, (4.51) follows from the fact that the sources
S1, . . . , Sk are mutually independent, and (4.52) follows from the fact that the source
Sk is memoryless. Moving nδk(n, ǫ) to the right-hand side of the inequality completes
the proof of Proposition 4.
Building on the result of Proposition 4, next let us show that for any (n, (M1, . . . ,ML))
code that satisfies both asymptotically perfect reconstruction constraint (4.34) and
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the perfect secrecy constraint (4.35) and any α = 1, . . . , L−N , we have
L∑
l=1
H(Xl) ≥
α∑
k=1
nL
k
H(Sk) + ∆α −
α∑
k=1
nLδk(n, ǫ) (4.53)
where
∆α :=
L
 L
N



 L−N
α


∑
A∈Ω
(N)
L
∑
D∈Ω
(α)
L\A
H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snα, XA)
α
. (4.54)
We shall consider proof by induction, where the induction is on α. First consider
the base case with α = 1. Let A ∈ Ω(N)L and let l ∈ ΩL \ A. Applying Proposition 4
with k = 1, we have
H(Xl) ≥ nH(S1) +H(Xl|Sn1 , XA)− nδ1(n, ǫ). (4.55)
Averaging (4.55) over all l ∈ ΩL \ A and all A ∈ Ω(N)L , we have
1
 L
N



 L−N
1


∑
A∈Ω
(N)
L
∑
l∈ΩL\A
H(Xl) ≥ nH(S1) + 1
L
∆1 − nδ1(n, ǫ). (4.56)
Note that
1
 L
N



 L−N
1


∑
A∈Ω
(N)
L
∑
l∈ΩL\A
H(Xl) =
1
L
L∑
l=1
H(Xl). (4.57)
We thus have
L∑
l=1
H(Xl) ≥ nLH(S1) + ∆1 − nLδ1(n, ǫ) (4.58)
which completes the proof of the base case.
Now assume that (4.53) holds for α − 1 for some 2 ≤ α ≤ L − N . Based on
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this assumption, next we show that (4.53) also holds for α. By the classical subset
inequality of Han [33, Chapter 17.6], for any A ∈ Ω(N)L we have
1

L−N
α− 1


∑
D∈Ω
(α−1)
L\A
H(XD |S
n
1 ,...,S
n
α−1,XA)
α−1
≥ 1

L−N
α


∑
D∈Ω
(α)
L\A
H(XD |S
n
1 ,...,S
n
α−1,XA)
α
.
(4.59)
It follows that
∆α−1 ≥ L
 L
N



 L−N
α


∑
A∈Ω
(N)
L
∑
D∈Ω
(α)
L\A
H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snα−1, XA)
α
. (4.60)
By Proposition 4, for any A ∈ Ω(N)L and any D ∈ Ω(α)L\A we have
H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snα−1, XA) ≥ nH(Sα) +H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snα, XA)− nδn(α, ǫ). (4.61)
Substituting (4.61) into (4.60) gives
∆α−1 ≥ L
 L
N



 L−N
α


∑
A∈Ω
(N)
L
∑
D∈Ω
(α)
L\A
nH(Sα) +H(XD|Sn1 , . . . , Snα, XA)− nδα(n, ǫ)
α
(4.62)
=
nL
α
H(Sα) + ∆α − nLδα(n, ǫ). (4.63)
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By the induction assumption,
L∑
l=1
H(Xl) ≥
α−1∑
k=1
nL
k
H(Sk) + ∆α−1 −
α−1∑
k=1
nLδk(n, ǫ) (4.64)
≥
α−1∑
k=1
nL
k
H(Sk) +
(
nL
α
H(Sα) + ∆α − nLδα(n, ǫ)
)
−
α−1∑
k=1
nLδk(n, ǫ) (4.65)
=
α∑
k=1
nL
k
H(Sk) + ∆α −
α∑
k=1
nLδk(n, ǫ). (4.66)
This completes the proof of the induction step and hence (4.53).
Finally, let α = L−N in (4.53). For any admissible rate tuple (R1, . . . , RL) and
any ǫ > 0, we have
n
L∑
l=1
(Rl + ǫ) ≥
L∑
l=1
H(Xl) (4.67)
≥
L−N∑
k=1
nL
k
H(Sk) + ∆L−N −
L−N∑
k=1
nLδk(n, ǫ) (4.68)
≥
L−N∑
k=1
nL
k
H(Sk)−
L−N∑
k=1
nLδk(n, ǫ) (4.69)
where (4.69) follows from the fact that ∆L−N ≥ 0. Divide both sides of (4.69) by n
and let n→∞ and ǫ→ 0. Note that δk(n, ǫ)→ 0 in the limit as n→∞ and ǫ→ 0
for all k = 1, . . . , L−N . We thus have
L∑
l=1
Rl ≥
L−N∑
k=1
L
k
H(Sk) (4.70)
for any admissible rate tuple (R1, . . . , RL). This completes the proof of Theorem 17.
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D. Concluding Remarks
This chapter considered the problem of S-SMDC, which is a natural (perhaps also
the simplest) extension of the classical SMDC problem [35, 36, 37, 38] to the secrecy
communication setting. First, the problem of encoding individual sources, i.e., the
S-SSDC problem, was studied. A precise characterization of the entire admissible
rate region was established via a connection to the problem of secure coding over a
three-layer WN [40] and utilizing some basic polyhedral structure of the admissible
rate region. Building on this result, it was then shown that the simple coding strategy
of separately encoding individual sources at the encoders (superposition coding) can
achieve the minimum sum rate for the general S-SMDC problem.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
Secure communication under channel uncertainty is an important and challenging
problem in physical-layer security and cryptography. In this dissertation, we take
a fundamental information-theoretic view at three concrete settings and use them
to shed insight into efficient secure communication techniques for different scenarios
under channel uncertainty.
First, a multi-input multi-output (MIMO) Gaussian broadcast channel with two
receivers and two messages: a common message intended for both receivers (i.e., chan-
nel uncertainty for decoding the common message at the receivers) and a confidential
message intended for one of the receivers but needing to be kept asymptotically per-
fectly secret from the other is considered. A matrix characterization of the secrecy
capacity region is established via a channel-enhancement argument and an extremal
entropy inequality previously established for characterizing the capacity region of a
degraded compound MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel.
Second, a multilevel security wiretap channel where there is one possible real-
ization for the legitimate receiver channel but multiple possible realizations for the
eavesdropper channel (i.e., channel uncertainty at the eavesdropper) is considered. A
coding scheme is designed such that the number of secure bits delivered to the legit-
imate receiver depends on the actual realization of the eavesdropper channel. More
specifically, when the eavesdropper channel realization is weak, all bits delivered to
the legitimate receiver need to be secure. In addition, when the eavesdropper channel
realization is strong, a prescribed part of the bits needs to remain secure. We call
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such codes security embedding codes, referring to the fact that high-security bits are
now embedded into the low-security ones. We show that the key to achieving efficient
security embedding is to jointly encode the low-security and high-security bits. In
particular, the low-security bits can be used as (part of) the transmitter randomness
to protect the high-security ones.
Finally, motivated by the recent interest in building secure, robust and efficient
distributed information storage systems, the problem of secure symmetrical multilevel
diversity coding (S-SMDC) is considered. This is a setting where there are channel
uncertainties at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. The problem of
encoding individual sources is first studied. A precise characterization of the entire
admissible rate region is established via a connection to the problem of secure coding
over a three-layer wiretap network and utilizing some basic polyhedral structure of
the admissible rate region. Building on this result, it is then shown that the simple
coding strategy of separately encoding individual sources at the encoders can achieve
the minimum sum rate for the general S-SMDC problem.
Several topics are worthy of future research. First, in Chapter III, it was shown
that the high-security message can be embedded into the low-security message at
full rate without incurring any loss on the overall rate of communication for both
scalar and independent parallel Gaussian channels (under an average individual per-
subchannel power constraint). The scenarios with multiple transmit and receive an-
tennas are considerably more complex and hence require further investigations.
Second, in Chapter III, we consider secure communication with one legitimate
receiver and one eavesdropper having multiple possible realizations. Which eaves-
dropper channel realization will occur is unknown to the transmitter. The number of
secure bits delivered to the legitimate receiver depends on the actual realization of
the eavesdropper channel. In many applications, however, security needs to be guar-
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anteed in that all bits delivered to the legitimate receiver need to be secure, no matter
which eavesdropper channel realization materializes. This communication scenario is
captured by a compound wiretap channel model [44], which can be viewed as a wire-
tap channel with one legitimate receiver and multiple eavesdroppers. The transmitter
wishes to transmit information to the legitimate receiver but keep it secret from all
eavesdroppers. When all the eavesdropper channels are degraded with respect to the
legitimate receiver channel, the secrecy capacity of this channel is known [44]. With-
out the degradedness assumption, however, the secrecy capacity of the compound
wiretap channel remains unknown in general. In [45], Liu et al. characterized the
secrecy capacity of the parallel Gaussian compound wiretap channel. The proposed
coding scheme in [45] to achieve the secrecy capacity is binning over a product code-
book, which is very specific for the parallel setting and hard to extend to the more
general MIMO setting. In [46], we proposed an alternative simple coding schemes
combining the security embedding codes with secure network coding. Generalizing
our coding schemes to MIMO settings may be worthy to investigate.
Lastly, based on the result of Theorem 17 in Chapter IV (and the fact that
superposition coding can achieve the entire admissible rate region for the classical
SMDC problems without secrecy constraints), it is very tempting to conjecture that
superposition coding can in fact achieve the entire admissible rate region for the
general S-SMDC problem. In Appendix E, we verify that this is indeed the case for
the simplest nontrivial S-SMDC problem: the (3, 1) S-SMDC problem. Our proof
relies on an explicit characterization of the superposition coding rate region via a
Fourier-Motzkin elimination procedure. The optimality of superposition coding is
then established by carefully using the results of Proposition 4.
Extending such a proof strategy to the general (L,N) S-SMDC problem, how-
ever, faces a number of challenges. To begin with, the complexity of Fourier-Motzkin
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elimination procedure grows unboundedly as the total number of encoders L increases.
Thus, establishing an explicit characterization of the superposition coding rate region
for the general (L,N) S-SMDC problem appears to be very difficult. An alterna-
tive strategy is to look for an implicit characterization of the superposition coding
rate region using optimal α-resolutions, similar to that [38] for the classical SMDC
problem without any secrecy constraints. In fact, note from Theorem 15 that the
admissible rate region of an (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem depends on the parameters
N and m only via its difference m − N . As mentioned previously in Section B,
when N = 0, the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem reduces to the classical (L,m) SSDC
problem without any secrecy constraints. Thus, the admissible rate region of the
(L,N,N + k) S-SSDC problem with source Sk is identical to that of the classical
(L, k) SSDC problem with the same source. As a result, the superposition coding
rate region of the (L,N) S-SMDC problem with sources (S1, . . . , SL−N) is identical
to the superposition coding rate region of the classical SMDC problem with a total of
L encoders and sources (S1, . . . , SL) where the entropy rate of the source H(Sl) = 0
for l = L − N + 1, . . . , L. Based on this observation, the α-resolution characteriza-
tion of the superposition coding rate region for the general SMDC problem can be
directly translated to the S-SMDC problem. It remains to see whether the properties
provided in [38] on optimal α-resolutions are sufficient for establishing the optimality
of superposition coding for the general S-SMDC problem. This problem is currently
under our investigations.
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APPENDIX A
THE CONVERSE PART OF PROPOSITION 1
In this appendix, we prove the converse part of Proposition 1. Here, we use Xji to
denote the vector (X [i], X [i+ 1], . . . , X [j]), and when i = 1, we further simplify the
notation by using Xj to denote the vector (X [1], X [2], . . . , X [j]). We also use Xi to
denote X [i].
We consider a
(
2nR0 , 2nR1, n
)
code with the average block error probability P
(n)
e .
Then we have the following joint probability distribution
p(w0, w1, x
n, y˜n1a, y
n
1b, y
n
2 ) = p(w0)p(w1)p(x
n|w0w1)
n∏
i=1
[p(y˜1ai|xi)p(y1biy2i|y˜1ai)]. (A.1)
By Fano’s inequality, we have
H(W0|Y n1b) ≤ nR0P (n)e + 1 := nδ1n (A.2)
H(W0|Y n2 ) ≤ nR0P (n)e + 1 := nδ1n (A.3)
H(W1|Y˜ n1a) ≤ nR1P (n)e + 1 := nδ2n (A.4)
where δ1n, δ2n → 0 if P (n)e → 0.
We define the following auxiliary random variable:
Ui := (W0, Y˜
i−1
1a ) (A.5)
which satisfies the Markov chain relationship
Ui → Xi → (Y˜1ai, Y1bi, Y2i).
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We first bound R0 as follows.
nR0 = H(W0) ≤ I(W0; Y n1b) + nδ1n (A.6)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W0; Y1bi|Y i−11b ) + nδ1n
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W0, Y˜
i−1
1a ; Y1bi|Y i−11b ) + nδ1n
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W0, Y˜
i−1
1a , Y
i−1
1b ; Y1bi) + nδ1n
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W0, Y˜
i−1
1a ; Y1bi) + nδ1n (A.7)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Y1bi) + nδ1n (A.8)
where (A.6) follows from Fano’s inequality (A.2), and (A.7) follows from the degrad-
edness condition, i.e., (W0, Y1bi) → Y˜ i−11a → Y i−11b . We can follow the steps similar to
those in (A.6)-(A.8) with Y1b being replaced by Y2, and obtain the following bound
nR0 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Y2i) + nδ1n. (A.9)
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We now bound nR1 and obtain
nR1 = H(W1|Y n2 ) (A.10)
= H(W1|W0, Y n2 ) + I(W1;W0|Y n2 )
≤ H(W1|W0, Y n2 ) + nδ1n
= I(W1; Y˜
n
1a|W0, Y n2 ) +H(W1|W0, Y n2 , Y˜ n1a) + nδ1n
≤ I(W1; Y˜ n1a|W0, Y n2 ) + nδ2n + nδ1n (A.11)
≤ I(W1, Xn; Y˜ n1a|W0, Y n2 ) + nδ2n + nδ1n
= I(Xn; Y˜ n1a|W0, Y n2 ) + nδ2n + nδ1n (A.12)
= H(Xn|W0, Y n2 )−H(Xn|W0, Y n2 , Y˜ n1a) + nδ2n + nδ1n
= H(Xn|W0, Y n2 )−H(Xn|W0, Y˜ n1a) + nδ2n + nδ1n (A.13)
= I(Xn; Y˜ n1a|W0)−H(Xn; Y n2 |W0) + nδ2n + nδ1n
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Xn; Y˜1ai|Y˜ i−11a ,W0)− I(Xn; Y2i|Y i−12 ,W0)
]
+ nδ2n + nδ1n
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Y˜1ai|Y˜ i−11a ,W0)−H(Y˜1ai|Y˜ i−11a ,W0, Xn)
−H(Y2i|Y i−12 ,W0) +H(Y2i|Y i−12 ,W0, Xn)
]
+ nδ2n + nδ1n
≤
n∑
i=1
[
H(Y˜1ai|Y˜ i−11a ,W0)−H(Y˜1ai|Y˜ i−11a ,W0, Xi)
−H(Y2i|Y˜ i−11a , Y i−12 ,W0) +H(Y2i|Y i−12 ,W0, Xi)
]
+ nδ2n + nδ1n (A.14)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
H(Y˜1ai|Y˜ i−11a ,W0)−H(Y˜1ai|Y˜ i−11a ,W0, Xi)
−H(Y2i|Y˜ i−11a ,W0) +H(Y2i|Y˜ i−11a ,W0, Xi)
]
+ nδ2n + nδ1n (A.15)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Xi; Y˜1ai|Ui)− I(Xi; Y2i|Ui)
]
+ nδ2n + nδ1n (A.16)
where (A.10) follows from perfect secrecy condition, (A.11) follows from Fano’s in-
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equality, (A.12) follows from the Markov chain (W0,W1) → (Xn, Y n2 ) → Y˜ n1a, (A.13)
follows from the degradedness condition, i.e., (Xn,W0) → Y˜ n1a → Y n2 , (A.14) follows
from the Markov chain relationship (Y˜ i−11a ,W0, X
n) → Xi → Y˜1ai and conditioning
does not increase entropy, and (A.15) follows from the Markov chain relationships
(Y2i,W0)→ Y˜ i−11a → Y i−12 and (Y i−12 , Y˜ i−11a ,W0)→ Xi → Y2i.
The single-letter outer bound can be obtained by letting J be a time-sharing
variable uniformly distributed over {1, . . . , n}, and define U = (UJ , J), X = XJ ,
Y˜1a = Y˜1aJ , Y1b = Y1bJ , and Y2 = Y2J .
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 7
Assume that the channel output Y is less noisy than Z2. To show that in this case the
sufficient condition (3.9) is also necessary, let (R1, R2) be an achievable rate pair. By
Fano’s inequality [33] and the asymptotic perfect secrecy constraints (3.1) and (3.2),
there exists a sequence of codes (indexed by the block length n) of rate pair (R1, R2)
such that
H(M1,M2|Y n) ≤ nǫn/2 (B.1)
I(M1;Z
n
1 ) ≤ nǫn/2 (B.2)
and I(M1,M2;Z
n
2 ) ≤ nǫn/2 (B.3)
where ǫn → 0 in the limit as n→∞.
Let M := (M1,M2), Y
i−1 := (Y [1], . . . , Y [i − 1]), Zn1,i+1 := (Z1[i + 1], ..., Z1[n]),
and Zn2,i+1 := (Z2[i+ 1], ..., Z2[n]). By (B.1) and (B.2), we have
n(R1 − ǫn) = H(M1)− nǫn (B.4)
≤ H(M1)− [I(M1;Zn1 ) +H(M1,M2|Y n)] (B.5)
= H(M1|Zn1 )−H(M1,M2|Y n) (B.6)
≤ H(M1,M2|Zn1 )−H(M1,M2|Y n) (B.7)
= I(M1,M2; Y
n)− I(M1,M2;Zn1 ) (B.8)
= I(M ; Y n)− I(M ;Zn1 ) (B.9)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M ; Y [i]|Y i−1)− I(M ;Z1[i]|Zn1,i+1)
]
(B.10)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M ; Y [i]|Y i−1, Zn1,i+1)− I(M ;Z1[i]|Y i−1, Zn1,i+1)
]
(B.11)
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where (B.11) follows from the well-known Csisza´r-Ko¨rner sum equality [4]. Similarly,
by (B.1), (B.3), and the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner sum equality [4], we may also obtain
n(R1 +R2 − ǫn) ≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(M ; Y [i]|Y i−1, Zn2,i+1)− I(M ;Z2[i]|Y i−1, Zn2,i+1)
]
. (B.12)
Further note that
I(M ; Y [i]|Y i−1, Zn2,i+1)− I(M ;Z2[i]|Y i−1, Zn2,i+1)
= I(M,Y i−1, Zn2,i+1; Y [i])− I(M,Y i−1, Zn2,i+1;Z2[i])
− [I(Y i−1, Zn2,i+1; Y [i])− I(Y i−1, Zn2,i+1;Z2[i])] (B.13)
= I(M,Y i−1, Zn2,i+1, Z
n
1,i+1; Y [i])− I(M,Y i−1, Zn2,i+1, Zn1,i+1;Z2[i])
− [I(Zn1,i+1; Y [i]|M,Y i−1, Zn2,i+1)− I(Zn1,i+1;Z2[i]|M,Y i−1, Zn2,i+1)]
− [I(Y i−1, Zn2,i+1; Y [i])− I(Y i−1, Zn2,i+1;Z2[i])] (B.14)
≤ I(M,Y i−1, Zn2,i+1, Zn1,i+1; Y [i])− I(M,Y i−1, Zn2,i+1, Zn1,i+1;Z2[i]) (B.15)
= I(M,Y i−1, Zn1,i+1; Y [i]) + I(Z
n
2,i+1; Y [i]|M,Y i−1, Zn1,i+1)
− [I(M,Y i−1, Zn1,i+1;Z2[i]) + I(Zn2,i+1;Z2[i]|M,Y i−1, Zn1,i+1)] (B.16)
= I(M,Y i−1, Zn1,i+1; Y [i])− I(M,Y i−1, Zn1,i+1;Z2[i]) (B.17)
where (B.15) is due to the fact that Y is less noisy than Z2 so we have
I(Zn1,i+1; Y [i]|M,Y i−1, Zn2,i+1) ≥ I(Zn1,i+1;Z2[i]|M,Y i−1, Zn2,i+1) (B.18)
and I(Y i−1, Zn2,i+1; Y [i]) ≥ I(Y i−1, Zn2,i+1;Z2[i]) (B.19)
and (B.17) is due to the Markov chain Zn2,i+1 → (M,Y i−1, Zn1,i+1) → (Y [i], Z2[i]) so
we have
I(Zn2,i+1; Y [i]|M,Y i−1, Zn1,i+1) = I(Zn2,i+1;Z2[i]|M,Y i−1, Zn1,i+1) = 0. (B.20)
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Substituting (B.17) into (B.12), we have
n(R1 +R2 − ǫn) ≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(M,Y i−1, Zn1,i+1; Y [i])− I(M,Y i−1, Zn1,i+1;Z2[i])
]
. (B.21)
Define U [i] := (Y i−1, Zn1,i+1), and V [i] := (U [i],M). We can rewrite (B.11) and
(B.21) as
n(R1 − ǫn) ≤
n∑
i=1
[I(V [i]; Y [i]|U [i])− I(V [i];Z1[i]|U [i])] (B.22)
and n(R1 +R2 − ǫn) ≤
n∑
i=1
[I(V [i]; Y [i])− I(V [i];Z2[i])] . (B.23)
Let Q be a standard time-sharing variable [33], and let U := (U [Q], Q), V :=
(V [Q], Q), X := X [Q], Y := Y [Q], Z1 := Z1[Q], Z2 := Z2[Q]. We have from (B.22)
and (B.23)
n(R1 − ǫn)
≤ n [I(V [Q]; Y [Q]|U [Q], Q)− I(V [Q];Z1[Q]|U [Q], Q)] (B.24)
= n [I(V [Q], Q; Y [Q]|U [Q], Q) − I(V [Q], Q;Z1[Q]|U [Q], Q)] (B.25)
= n [I(V ; Y |U)− I(V ;Z1; |U)] (B.26)
and n(R1 +R2 − ǫn)
≤ n [I(V [Q]; Y [Q]|Q)− I(V [Q];Z2[Q]|Q)] (B.27)
= n [I(V [Q], Q; Y [Q])− I(V [Q], Q;Z2[Q])]
− n [I(Q; Y [Q])− I(Q;Z2[Q])] (B.28)
≤ n [I(V [Q], Q; Y [Q])− I(V [Q], Q;Z2[Q])] (B.29)
= n [I(V ; Y )− I(V ;Z2)] (B.30)
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where (B.29) is due to the fact that Y is less noisy than Z2 so we have
I(Q; Y [Q]) ≥ I(Q;Z2[Q]). (B.31)
Divide both sides of (B.26) and (B.30) by n and then let n → ∞. The proof is
complete by noting that the channel is memoryless, so we have U [i]→ V [i]→ X [i]→
(Y [i], Z1[i], Z2[i]) for all i = 1, . . . , n.
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APPENDIX C
EXISTENCE OF AN H WITH Ψ(H) = 0
To show that there exists a parity-check matrix H such that Ψ(H) = 0, it is sufficient
to show that EΨ(H) < 1 where EX denotes the expectation of a random variable X .
Let
Ψ0(H) :=


1, rank(H) < n(1− α2 − ǫ)
0, otherwise
(C.1)
and
Ψi(H,Γ) :=


1, Di(Γ) < n(1 − αi − ǫ)− 3/ǫ
0, otherwise,
i = 1, 2. (C.2)
By the union bound,
EΨ(H) ≤ EΨ0(H) +
2∑
i=1
∑
Γ⊆{1,...,n}
|Γ|=nαi
EΨi(H,Γ). (C.3)
Following [32, Lemma 6], we have
EΨ0(H) ≤ n(1 − α2 − ǫ)2
−n(α2+ǫ)
1− 2−n(α2+ǫ) <
1
2
(C.4)
for sufficiently large n. Furthermore, by [32, Lemma 5], for any Γ ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such
that |Γ| = nαi, we have
EΨi(H,Γ) ≤ 2−3n+n(1−αi−ǫ) ≤ 2−2n. (C.5)
Since the total number of different subsets of {1, . . . , n} is 2n, we have
2∑
i=1
∑
Γ⊆{1,...,n}
|Γ|=nαi
EΨi(H,Γ) ≤ 2 · 2n · 2−2n = 2−n+1 < 1
2
(C.6)
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for any n > 2. Substituting (C.4) and (C.6) into (C.3) proves that EΨ(H) < 1 for
sufficiently large n, and hence the existence of a parity-check matrix H such that
Ψ(H) = 0.
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Let D ∈ Ω(m−N)L and let A ∈ Ω(N)L\D. Since A ∩D = ∅, we have |D ∪ A| = N + (m −
N) = m. For any (n, (M1, . . . ,ML)) code that satisfies both asymptotically perfect
reconstruction constraint (4.4) and the perfect secrecy constraint (4.5), we have by
Fano’s inequality
H(Sn|XD, XA) ≤ nδ(n, ǫ) (D.1)
where
δ(n, ǫ) = 1/n+ ǫ log |S| (D.2)
and
H(Sn|XA) = H(Sn). (D.3)
For any admissible rate tuple (R1, . . . , RL) and any ǫ > 0, we have
n
∑
l∈D
(Rl + ǫ) ≥
∑
l∈D
H(Xl) (D.4)
≥ H (XD) (D.5)
≥ H (XD|XA) (D.6)
≥ H (XD|XA) +H (Sn|XD, XA)− nδ(n, ǫ) (D.7)
= H (XD, S
n|XA)− nδ(n, ǫ) (D.8)
= H (Sn|XA) +H (XD|Sn, XA)− nδ(n, ǫ) (D.9)
≥ H (Sn|XA)− nδ(n, ǫ) (D.10)
= H (Sn)− nδ(n, ǫ) (D.11)
= nH(S)− nδ(n, ǫ) (D.12)
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where (D.5) follows from the independence bound on entropy, (D.6) follows from the
fact that conditioning reduces entropy, (D.7) follows from (D.1), (D.11) follows from
(D.3), and (D.12) follows from the fact that the source S is memoryless. Divide both
sides of (D.12) by n and let n→∞ and ǫ→ 0. Note that δ(n, ǫ)→ 0 in the limit as
n→∞ and ǫ→ 0. We have from (D.12) that
∑
l∈D
Rl ≥ H(S), ∀D ∈ Ω(m−N)L . (D.13)
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
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APPENDIX E
THE ADMISSIBLE RATE REGION OF THE (3, 1) S-SMDC PROBLEM
In this appendix, we show that superposition coding can achieve the entire admissible
rate region for the (3, 1) S-SMDC problem (the simplest nontrivial S-SMDC problem).
The result is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 18. Superposition coding can achieve the entire admissible rate region
for the (3, 1) S-SMDC problem, which is given by the collection of all rate triples
(R1, R2, R3) satisfying
R1 ≥ H(S1)
R2 ≥ H(S1)
R3 ≥ H(S1)
R1 +R2 ≥ 2H(S1) +H(S2)
R2 +R3 ≥ 2H(S1) +H(S2)
R3 +R1 ≥ 2H(S1) +H(S2).
(E.1)
Proof. Achievability. Consider the superposition coding scheme that separately en-
codes the sources S1 and S2 using the (3, 1, 2) and (3, 1, 3) S-SSDC codes, respectively.
By Theorem 15, the admissible rate region for the (3, 1, 2) S-SSDC problem is given
by all rate triples (R
(1)
1 , R
(1)
2 , R
(1)
3 ) satisfying
R
(1)
1 ≥ H(S1)
R
(1)
2 ≥ H(S1)
R
(1)
3 ≥ H(S1)
(E.2)
and the admissible rate region for the (3, 1, 3) S-SSDC problem is given by all rate
109
triples (R
(2)
1 , R
(2)
2 , R
(2)
3 ) satisfying
R
(2)
1 ≥ 0
R
(2)
2 ≥ 0
R
(2)
3 ≥ 0
R
(2)
1 +R
(2)
2 ≥ H(S2)
R
(2)
2 +R
(2)
3 ≥ H(S2)
R
(2)
3 +R
(2)
1 ≥ H(S2).
(E.3)
Following (4.37), all rate triples (R1, R2, R3) as given by
Rl = R
(1)
l +R
(2)
l , ∀l = 1, 2, 3 (E.4)
are admissible via superposition coding. Using Fourier-Motzkin elimination to elim-
inate R
(k)
l , l = 1, 2, 3 and k = 1, 2, from (E.2)–(E.4), we obtain the explicit charac-
terization of the superposition coding rate region for the (3, 1) S-SMDC problem as
expressed by (E.1).
The converse. Next, we establish the optimality of superposition coding by prov-
ing that every inequality in (E.1) must hold for all admissible rate triples (R1, R2, R3)
for the (3, 1) S-SMDC problem. Let
a⊕ b :=


a + b, if a + b ≤ 3
a + b− 3, otherwise.
(E.5)
110
For any admissible rate triple (R1, R2, R3), any l = 1, 2, 3, and any ǫ > 0, we have
n(Rl + ǫ) ≥ H(Xl) (E.6)
≥ H(Xl|Xl⊕1) (E.7)
≥ nH(S1) +H(Xl|Sn1 , Xl⊕1)− nδ1(n, ǫ) (E.8)
≥ nH(S1)− nδ1(n, ǫ) (E.9)
and
n(Rl +Rl⊕1 + 2ǫ)
≥ H(Xl) +H(Xl⊕1) (E.10)
≥ H(Xl|Xl⊕1) +H(Xl⊕1|Xl⊕2) (E.11)
≥ 2nH(S1) +H(Xl|Sn1 , Xl⊕1) +H(Xl⊕1|Sn1 , Xl⊕2)− 2nδ1(n, ǫ) (E.12)
≥ 2nH(S1) +H(Xl|Sn1 , Xl⊕1, Xl⊕2) +H(Xl⊕1|Sn1 , Xl⊕2)
−2nδ1(n, ǫ) (E.13)
= 2nH(S1) +H(Xl, Xl⊕1|Sn1 , Xl⊕2)− 2nδ1(n, ǫ) (E.14)
≥ 2nH(S1) + (nH(S2) +H(Xl, Xl⊕1|Sn1 , Sn2 , Xl⊕2)− nδ2(n, ǫ))
−2nδ1(n, ǫ) (E.15)
≥ 2nH(S1) + nH(S2)− nδ2(n, ǫ)− 2nδ1(n, ǫ). (E.16)
Here, (E.7), (E.11) and (E.13) follow from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy,
and (E.8), (E.12) and (E.15) follow from Proposition 4. Dividing both sides of (E.9)
and (E.16) by n and letting n → ∞ and ǫ → 0 complete the proof of the converse
part of the theorem.
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